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Location Tracking by Police: The
Regulation of ‘Tireless and Absolute
Surveillance’
Bert-Jaap Koops,* Bryce Clayton Newell,** and Ivan Škorvánek***
Location information reveals people’s whereabouts, but can also tell
much about their habits, preferences, and, ultimately, much of their
private lives. Current surveillance technologies used in criminal
investigation include many techniques to track someone’s movements; not
all are equally intrusive. This raises the following questions: how do
jurisdictions draw boundaries between lesser and more serious privacy
intrusions? What factors play a role? How are geolocational privacy
interests framed? In this Article, we answer these questions through a
comparative analysis of location-tracking regulation in eight
jurisdictions: Canada, Czechia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
We analyze the legal status of location tracking through human
observation, GPS tracking, cell-phone tracking, IMSI catchers
(Stingrays), silent SMS, automated license-plate recognition, and
directional Wi-Fi tracking in these countries. This results in highly
context-dependent and case-specific assessments, in which eight factors
play a role: use of a technical device, place, intensity, duration, degree of
suspicion, object of tracking, covertness, and active generation of data.
At a deeper level of analysis, we identify different conceptualizations of
privacy underlying these assessments: not only classic privacy frames, such
as communications secrecy, protection of home and body, and
informational privacy, but also two new privacy frames: freedom of
movement in combination with anonymity, and the mosaic theory. Thus,
we discern a tentative but unmistakable shift in how lawmakers and
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courts assess the intrusiveness of location tracking, particularly of
people’s movements in public space.
Traditional privacy frames tend to downplay the seriousness of the
privacy infringement enabled by location tracking, and our analysis
demonstrates an increasing discomfort with this tendency, leading to the
emergence of novel privacy frames (or theories) to regulate what might
easily turn into what the Supreme Court of the United States has called
“tireless and absolute surveillance.” We conclude that legal privacy
frameworks developed in past centuries prove ill-suited for assessing the
privacy-intrusiveness of contemporary location-tracking investigation
methods, and that emerging, novel frameworks for understanding and
protecting privacy may provide lawmakers and courts with the tools
needed to address the challenge of preserving (geolocational) privacy in
the twenty-first century.
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INTRODUCTION
In the cell-phone era, one of the most common questions people ask each
other is “Where are you?”1 In fact, people have always been interested in knowing
where someone is or has been, and they have devised various strategies to find out,
besides simply asking, “Where are you?” or “Where have you been?” For instance,
the Mehinacu in Brazil can track people’s movements from telltale traces on the
ground: “The paths are also sandy, and people know one another’s footprints, so
that a person’s whereabouts are known even if he or she isn’t readily visible.”2
Today’s footprints stretch widely beyond the sand: we leave digital footprints
everywhere, including locational traces. Moreover, current surveillance technologies
include a wide variety of techniques to track someone’s movements, including GPS
trackers, IMSI catchers (Stingrays), automatic vehicle location (AVL), and
automated license/number plate recognition (ALPR/ANPR). Additionally, new or
more sophisticated methods continue to be developed, such as stealth SMS,
directional Wi-Fi tracking,3 and wide-area surveillance arrays mounted on flying
objects such as planes or helicopters.4

1. MAURIZIO FERRARIS, WHERE ARE YOU? AN ONTOLOGY OF THE CELL PHONE 2 (Sarah
De Sanctis trans., 2005) (arguing that the question “Where are you?” grasps the essence of the
transformation induced by cell phones).
2. IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL
SPACE, TERRITORY, CROWDING 12 (1975).
3. See infra Sections II(B)–(E).
4. Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above, B LOOMBERG
B USINESSWEEK (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secretsurveillance/[ https://web.archive.org/web/20190128162420/https:/www.bloomberg.com/features/
2016-baltimore-secret-surveillance/] (by using a wide-area array of surveillance cameras mounted on a
plane flying over Baltimore, investigators “could backtrack to see where [a] vehicle had come from,
marking all of the addresses it had visited. They also could fast-forward to see where the driver went
after [committing a crime]”).
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Obviously, such methods are highly relevant to criminal investigations.
Indeed, location tracking by the police (or the acquisition and use of historical
location data) has become a central question in a number of high-profile cases in
recent years.5 In these cases, the question is reframed by investigators as something
like, “Where were you at the time the crime was committed?” As suggested by that
version of the question, location information can be vital for pinning down a
suspect to a crime scene or providing them with an alibi. Indeed, real-time and
historical geolocation data has become a common piece of evidence collected in
criminal investigations. As one indication of the importance of locational records to
police investigations, the United States Supreme Court has addressed geolocational
tracking in a growing number of Fourth Amendment cases stretching back to the
1980s. For example, in United States v. Knotts6 and United States v. Karo,7 the Supreme
Court had to decide whether the warrantless use of 1980s tracking technologies
(“beepers”) to track the movements of suspects’ automobiles amounted to
unreasonable searches (the Court held they did not, in both cases, but for different
reasons). In 2012, the Court decided that the warrantless installation of a GPS
tracking device did violate a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights, on the theory that
the physical installation of the device amounted to an unlawful interference with the
suspect’s property interests in the vehicle.8 Most recently, in Carpenter v. United
States, the Court held that the police generally need a warrant to acquire a
subscriber’s historical location records from a wireless carrier, as cell-phone users
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records of their movements
generated by the use of their cellular phones.9
Location tracking by police not only encompasses various technologies, it also
features different forms and methods. For instance, police can track particular
suspects, but also trace possible witnesses of a crime; they can follow the
movements of persons, but also of objects, such as cell-phones or containers; and
they can collect data about movements in the past, or track movements in real time.
Some of these forms of tracking are highly intrusive. The creation of an ALPR
database has been associated with the move towards a surveillance society and called
“straight out of the Big Brother handbook,”10 while the use of tracking devices to
dominate and control the location of others has been called a form of

5. See e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400 (2012). For earlier cases, see also, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
6. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276.
7. Karo, 468 U.S. at 705.
8. Jones, 565 U.S. at 400.
9. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206.
10. Roger Clarke, The Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle Surveillance in Australia, in THE
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF COVERT POLICING: THE FOURTH WORKSHOP ON THE SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 47, 57–58 (Simon Bronitt, Clive Harfield & Katina Michael
eds., 2010).
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“geoslavery.”11 The cell-phone metadata released by German politician Malte Spitz
enabled the creation of not only a precise map of his movements over the prior six
months, but also a clear picture of his habits and preferences: “it reveals an entire
life.”12
Yet not all forms and applications of location tracking are equally intrusive:
putting a transponder on a package or container to determine where it will be
delivered is less privacy-intrusive than tailing someone for a month; collecting cellsite location information of peoples’ cell-phone movements is more privacyinvasive than GPS tracking of their cars (since phones are usually used more often
than cars and kept closer to the person). These differences raise questions about
how intrusive location tracking is, or rather, on what basis we can and should assess
the intrusiveness of the many forms of location tracking by police. This question is
relevant not only because new forms of location tracking challenge lawmakers and
courts, but also since they may not neatly fit into current legal frameworks. It is also
relevant because a shift seems to be taking place with how the intrusiveness of
location tracking is assessed, particularly where it concerns tracking people’s
movements in public spaces. Traditionally, this is seen as only somewhat intrusive,
since people voluntarily expose their movements in such places to third parties.13
Increasingly, however, scholars (and, to some extent, lawmakers and courts), are
recognizing that surveillance in public places can be highly intrusive as well. Thus,
new normative frameworks, such as the mosaic theory, are being developed to
assess location tracking’s intrusiveness without resorting to the age-old private
space/public space distinction.14
In this Article, we aim to identify how eight different jurisdictions assess and
establish the privacy-invasiveness of location tracking and how they are drawing
boundaries between lesser and more serious privacy intrusions. We analyze the
factors that play a role in these assessments and how privacy interests in location
information are being framed. To answer these questions, we conducted doctrinal
legal analysis15 of the relevant law in eight jurisdictions (Canada, Czechia, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and

11. William A. Herbert, No Direction Home: Will the Law Keep Pace with Human Tracking
Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?, 2 I/S: J.L. POL’Y 409, 429 (2006) (arguing
that imposing restrictions, control, and monitoring over another’s location constitutes a vestige and
incident of slavery).
12. Kai Biermann, Betrayed by Our Own Data, DIE ZEIT, (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz [ https://perma.cc/
TAC4-8KZB ].
13. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
14. See, e.g., PRIVACY IN PUBLIC SPACE: CONCEPTUAL AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES
(Tjerk Timan, Bryce Clayton Newell & Bert-Jaap Koops eds., 2017) (featuring contributions that
explore contemporary challenges to achieving privacy and anonymity in physical public space where
legal protection remains limited compared to private spaces); see also infra Sections II(B)(2) and III(B)(3).
15. Legal doctrinal analysis involves study of statutes and case law to analyze how and why an
issue is regulated in a legal system. See Terry Hutchinson, Doctrinal Research, in RESEARCH METHODS
IN LAW 7 (Dawn Watkins & Mandy Burton eds., 2013).
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compared our findings across jurisdictions.16 We selected these countries because
while they have somewhat different cultures and histories and reflect both commonlaw and civil-law traditions, they are sufficiently similar in terms of their legal
systems and technological development to enable comparisons; thus, the selection
offers a useful mix of differences and similarities. These similarities and differences
offer interesting insights into how various legal traditions shape their privacy
assessments in the context of criminal procedure.17
The Article is structured as follows. We start in Section I with a broad
overview of the relevant laws, broadly summarizing the legal status of location
tracking across each of the eight jurisdictions. This may also serve as a quick
reference section for the reader. In Section II, we discuss the legal status of location
tracking in more detail, distinguishing between human observation, GPS tracking,
cell-phone tracking, ALPR, and other forms of tracking. In Section III, we follow
this description with an analysis and discussion of our primary findings. First, we
analyze which factors lawmakers and courts in the studied jurisdictions use to assess
the intrusiveness of location tracking; eight such factors turn out to be relevant: use
of a technical device, place, intensity, duration, degree of suspicion, object of
tracking, covertness, and active generation of data. Second, we analyze how privacy
is framed—that is, which conceptualizations of privacy are applied in the context
of location tracking? We identify not only classic privacy frames, such as
communications secrecy, protection of the home, bodily integrity, and
informational privacy, but also two new privacy frames being applied to address
new criminal investigation methods, namely freedom of movement in combination
with anonymity, and the mosaic theory. Finally, we conclude that legal privacy
frameworks developed in past centuries prove ill-suited for assessing the privacyintrusiveness of contemporary location-tracking investigation methods, and that
emerging, novel frameworks for understanding and protecting privacy may provide
lawmakers and courts with the tools needed to address the challenge of preserving
geolocational privacy in the twenty-first century.

16. Throughout the text, we refer to these countries’ Code of Criminal Procedure as [country
name’s] CPC, and to the Criminal Code as [country name’s] CC. For brevity’s sake, we use the term
“warrant” as shorthand for the requisite authorization by a judge or court, although the exact type and
term for court authorization may differ per country. All translations are ours (unless otherwise
indicated).
17. See Gerhard Danneman, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 384, 389–98, 403–04, 408 (Mathias Reimann &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (discussing the importance of comparing jurisdictions which share
both similarities and differences); see also Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell, Tjerk Timan, Ivan
Škorvánek, Tomislav Chokrevski & Maša Galič, A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 505–
06 (2017) (further explaining the reasons for choosing these countries for comparative purposes).
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I. BROAD OVERVIEW OF LAWS ON POLICE LOCATION TRACKING
Since many of the particular technologies discussed below are covered by the
same provisions in criminal procedure law, we first give a high-level overview of
the most relevant legal provisions and cases in the jurisdictions studied (except
where they specifically relate to a particular technology—those are discussed in
Section II, infra).
In Canada, warrantless location tracking by the police is governed by judicial
interpretations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms18 and
generally requires a special tracking warrant. There are very few cases examining the
application of section 8 to location tracking by the police; in these, defendants were
unsuccessful in arguing that the standards for obtaining tracking warrants are
unconstitutional.19 Location tracking can be authorized, however, by trackingspecific warrants outlined in section 492.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code, which
stipulates conditions for obtaining a warrant for tracking devices targeted at
transactions, things, or individuals.20 For purposes of a section 492.1 warrant, a
tracking device is defined as “a device, including a computer program . . . that may
be used to obtain or record tracking data or to transmit it by a means of
telecommunication.”21 When such a warrant is granted, it allows a police officer “to
install, activate, use, maintain, monitor and remove the tracking device, including
covertly,”22 subject to any conditions imposed by the judge,23 but only for a
maximum of 60 days from the date the warrant was issued.24
In Czechia, police tracking is governed by Article 158d of the Czech Code of
Criminal Procedure on observing persons and objects. Visual recordings of
someone’s movements in public space25 or digital maps of the person’s movement
created by, for instance, GPS tracking26 can only be created with a public
prosecutor’s written approval. These approvals can be granted if there is concrete
suspicion of criminal activity; sufficient justification of the necessity to create visual,
audio, or other records; and a description of the persons or object to be observed.27
The permit is issued for no longer than six months (but can be extended indefinitely
every six months).28

18. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 8, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). (“Everyone has the right to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure”).
19. See, e.g., R. v. Grandison, 2016 BCSC 1712 (Can.); R. v. Edwards, 2014 ONSC 6323 (Can.).
20. For some discussion, see e.g., R. v. Grandison, 2016 BCSC 1712 (Can.).
21. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 492.1(8) (Can.).
22. Id. § 492.1(3).
23. Id. § 492.1(4).
24. Id. § 492.1(5).
25. TRESTNÍ ŘÁD I, II, III, KOMENTÁŘ 1993 (P. Šámal ed., 2013).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2008.
28. Trestní řád, Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb. § 158d(4) (Czech).
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In Germany, various provisions regulate tracking, depending on the
modalities. In limited form—less than 24 hours, using only simple perceptionenhancing technology such as binoculars, and only outside of the home—tracking
can be based on sections 161 and 163 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure,
which regulate the general power of the public prosecutor and police to investigate
crime without a warrant. For longer or more intrusive tracking, section 163f on
“Long-Term Observation” can be used if the investigation concerns a crime of
“substantial significance” and if other means of establishing the perpetrator’s
location would offer much less prospect of success or would be much more
difficult.29 This requires a warrant (Richtervorbehalt).30 Not only accused persons can
be tracked: others can also be subjected to location tracking if a link between the
perpetrator and the other person can be established and “the measure will lead
to . . . determination of the perpetrator’s whereabouts” and “using other means
would offer much less prospect of success or be much more difficult.”31
Location tracking can also be conducted using existing police checks to search
for the accused under section 163e of the German Code of Criminal Procedure.32
To create a full movement pattern, this measure is aimed at establishing the
accused’s travel pattern or route, means of transportation, carried goods, and
companions.33 The measure is admissible against people who are not themselves
suspects, but only if strong suspicion exists that the measure can lead to relevant
findings related to the suspect and other measures would offer much less prospect
of success.34 License plates can be included in the observation of cars registered to
or in use with the accused.35 This type of tracking also requires a warrant and can
be conducted for up to one year.36 Some other forms of tracking can be based on
section 100h of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, which regulates “other
measures outside of dwellings,” using technical devices for observation purposes
other than visual or aural recording devices, such as RFID tracking,37 “stealth
ping,”38 night-vision devices,39 or drones.40 To utilize these methods, there must be

29. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 163f(1) (Ger.).
30. Id. § 163f(3).
31. Id. § 163f(1).
32. Id. § 163e.
33. URS KINDHÄUSER, STRAFPROZESSRECHT § 163e, Rn. 18–19 (4th ed. 2016).
34. STPO § 163e(1).
35. Id. § 163e(2).
36. Id. § 163e(4).
37. BJÖRN GERCKE ET AL., HEIDELBERGER KOMMENTAR ZUR STPO § 100h, Rn 4 (5th
ed. 2012).
38. SIGRID HEGMANN, BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR STPO § 100h, Rn. 6 (27th
ed. 2017).
39. RALF GÜNTHER, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUR STPO § 100h, Rn. 6. (1st. ed. 2014).
40. Tobias Singelnstein, Bildaufnahmen, Orten, Abhören – Entwicklungen und Streitfragen beim
Einsatz technischer Mittel zur Strafverfolgung, NSTZ 2014 at 305, 308.
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reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence of substantial significance,41 but no
warrant is required.
In Italy, there are no specific statutory provisions on location tracking, and
the case law on tracking is largely limited to GPS tracking. In a consistent stream of
case law, spearheaded by a judgment in 2002, the Italian Supreme Court found that
GPS tracking can—just as human tailing albeit in this case technologically facilitated
at a distance—be considered an ordinary activity of examination and ascertainment
required from the police on the basis of Articles 55, 347, and 370 of the Italian
Criminal Procedure Code.42 These Articles allow the police to conduct activities that
do not substantially infringe fundamental rights or liberties, without further specific
statutory rules or safeguards. Tailing and GPS tracking are considered activities that
constitute at most a minor privacy interference (not infringing the constitutional
right to secrecy of communications43), so that no judicial authorisation is required,
not even—in contrast to a production order of traffic data—a motivated order
from the public prosecutor.44
In the Netherlands, location tracking currently generally falls under the
power of “systematic observation” (stelselmatige observatie), which covers visual
surveillance and other forms of sensory perception with or without technical
devices, as long as no communications are recorded.45 Systematic observation is
described as “systematically follow[ing] a person or systematically observ[ing]
[a person’s] movements or behavior.”46 The police can observe suspects but also
non-suspected persons, such as witnesses.47 Systematic observation requires an
order from the public prosecutor but no warrant and can be conducted for any
felony, so it is a low-threshold investigative power.48 The order can be given for
a maximum period of three months but can be prolonged repeatedly
41. STPO § 100h(1).
42. Cass., sez. V, 27 febbraio 2002, n. 16130 (It.). See also, e.g., Cass., sez, I, 10 febbraio 2012,
n. 14529 (It.), quoted in Teresa Bene, Il pedinamento elettronico: truismi e problemi spinosi, in LE
INDAGINI ATIPICHE 347, 348 (Adolfo Scalfati ed., 2014).
43. Art. 15 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
44. Cass., sez. V, 27 febbraio 2002, n. 16130 (It.); see also, e.g., Cass., sez, I, 10 febbraio 2012,
n. 14529 (It.), quoted in Bene, supra note 42 at 348.
45. Art. 126g(1) CPC (Neth.).
46. Id.
47. G.J.M. CORSTENS & M.J. BORGERS, HET NEDERLANDS STRAFPROCESRECHT 509 (8th
ed. 2014).
48. Art. 126g(1) CPC (Neth.); cf. Ybo Buruma, Stelselmatig, een sleutelbegrip in de Wet bijzondere
opsporingsbevoegdheden, 25 NJCM-BULLETIN 649, 651 (2000) (wondering why systematic observation is
considered a less intrusive power than, e.g., entering a shed in a meadow or covertly recording a
conversation in a market-place). Note that in the proposed modernization of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, systematic observation will be allowed only for offenses carrying a maximum prison
sentence of one year or more. For more information on this, see proposed art. 2.8.2.1.1 of the Concept
Wetsvoorstel tot vaststelling van Boek 2 van het nieuwe Wetboek van Strafvordering: Het opsporingsonderzoek
[ draft Bill for book 2 of the new Criminal Procedure Code: Criminal Investigation, hereinafter Concept
Wetsvoorstel Boek 2] , February 2017, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/
2017/02/07/wetsvoorstel-tot-vaststelling-van-boek-2-van-het-nieuwe-wetboek-van-strafvordering
[ https://perma.cc/A8X3-FEY7 ] (Neth.).
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with three-month periods.49 To ensure reliability of the evidence, technical devices
(e.g., binoculars, photo and video cameras, infrared cameras, thermal imagers,
movement detection equipment, and tracking devices50) must comply with
conditions of the Technical Devices Decree.51
The proposed modernization of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with a draft
bill published for consultation,52 includes a specific power for “systematic
determination of location.” This would be an auxiliary power to enable executing
one of the covert investigation powers, such as observation, infiltration, or oral
interception; the conditions for systematic determination of location are therefore
not sui generis but tied to those of another investigation power. The only limitation
is that orders for systematic location-determination can be given for at most a
month, which can be prolonged repeatedly with additional one-month periods.53
In Poland, the Code of Criminal Procedure does not regulate covert
surveillance powers, except for telecommunication interception. Observations are
regulated instead by the Police Act in the context of operational-exploratory
activities, which are extra-procedural police powers.54 Except for observations in
non-public places, which are regulated more strictly,55 the powers of the police to
observe and record anything that occurs in public places are almost unlimited under
the Police Act. Article 15 allows the police to observe directly (with physical
presence of the police officers) and at a distance (via technical means) any event
occurring in public spaces,56 both openly and covertly.57 This is not limited to
particular criminal offences and can be used in any operational matter, does not
require approval of a prosecutor or court, and no time limits apply. The only
limitation is that the surveillance must be conducted in a manner that minimizes the
interference with the personal goods of the persons against whom it is undertaken.58
In the United Kingdom, location tracking is covered by Part II of the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), which extends to “monitoring,
observing or listening to persons, their movements, conversations or other activities

49. Art. 126g(4) CPC (Neth.).
50. Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, p. 71 (Neth.).
51. Art. 126ee CPC (Neth.). See Decree on Technical Devices in Criminal Procedure (Besluit
technische hulpmiddelen strafvordering) (Neth.).
52. Concept Wetsvoorstel Boek 2 (Neth.), supra note 48.
53. Id., proposed art. 2.8.2.10.1.
54. Act of 6 April 1990 on the Police (Pol.).
55. Art. 19 Police Act (Pol.) (regulating operational surveillance in non-public places).
56. Art. 15(5a) Police Act (Pol.) (stipulating that police officers are allowed in the exercise of
their service to “observe and, using technical means, register the image of events in public places, and
in cases of operational-exploratory and administrative-order activities performed on statutory basis, also
the sound associated with those events”).
57. BARTOLOMIEJ OPALINSKI, MACIEJ ROGALSKI & PRZEMYSLAW SZUSTAKIEWICZ,
USTAWA O POLICJI, KOMENTARZ 75–76 (2015).
58. Art. 15(6) Police Act (Pol.).
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and communications.”59 To engage in location tracking or other forms of
surveillance, the police must obtain an “authorisation” whenever the intended
surveillance is “directed” or “intrusive,” as defined by section 26 RIPA.60
Authorisations, which typically last for three months, do not generally need to be
judicially approved, as a designated official of a public body (e.g., an appointee
within the police services) may execute authorisations; for most police forces, this
will be the superintendent.61 The Code of Practice stipulates particular
proportionality and subsidiarity requirements for granting authorisations.62 An
authorisation for “directed surveillance” or “intrusive surveillance” under RIPA
(Part II) provides a public authority with “a lawful basis . . . to carry out covert
surveillance activity that is likely to result in the obtaining of private information
about a person,”63 which includes various forms of location tracking.
Finally, in the United States, location tracking is largely regulated through
Fourth Amendment case law.64 Prior to Jones and Carpenter, the use of GPS devices
was generally considered permissible without a warrant, as was tracking the location
of certain objects through technical devices.65 In the landmark case of Jones,
however, the Supreme Court determined that physically installing a GPS tracking
unit on a suspect’s vehicle requires a warrant, as it constitutes an interference with
the defendant’s property interest66 (and, according to the concurring opinions,
because it violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy through the
cumulative effect of prolonged instances of short-term surveillance).67
Furthermore, in Carpenter, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless acquisition
of 127 days’ worth of cell site location information (CSLI) violated a person’s
protected privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment and that a person
maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in such records regardless of

59. HOME OFFICE, COVERT SURVEILLANCE AND PROPERTY INTERFERENCE: REVISED
CODE OF PRACTICE 7 (Aug. 2018) (UK).
60. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 c. 23 § 26(1)(a)–(b) (UK).
61. The prescribed authorizing officer depends on the particular police force. See The
Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources)
Order 2010, Schedule 1 (UK).
62. HOME OFFICE, supra note 59, at 27.
63. Id. at 26. Private information is defined as “any information” that relates to the “private or
family life” of any person. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2010 § 26(10) (UK).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (“beeper” installed inside a can); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (using a “beeper” in a chloroform container).
66. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). Note that in many later cases where the GPS
tracking had occurred prior to Jones, courts have applied the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary
rule, admitting evidence since the officers had reasonably relied on existing legal precedent at the
time they installed the tracking devices. See, e.g., United States v. Cabrera, 651 Fed. Appx. 118 (3rd
Cir. 2016) (pre-Jones GPS tracking of vehicle fell within exclusionary rule’s good faith exception); United
States v. Taylor, 776 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2015) (warrantless GPS tracking of vehicle was reasonable preJones).
67. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 428–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
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“[w]hether the Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones or
leverages the technology of a wireless carrier.”68
To obtain a warrant for using a “tracking device” (defined broadly as
“an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of
a person or object”69), Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 stipulates certain
specific requirements, particularly relating to the period of installing a device (within
10 days) and the period of execution (an extensible period of at most 45 days).70
Also, Rule 41 (and Fourth Amendment case law) requires probable cause to obtain
a tracking warrant.71
II. TYPES OF TRACKING
In this section, we discuss how lawmakers have regulated different forms of
location tracking, with particular focus on the categories and criteria used to
determine the level of privacy infringement. Due to scope limitations, we do not
discuss all jurisdictions from our comparative study for each type of tracking; rather,
we focus on the most illustrative examples.
A. Human Observation
The most classic form of location tracking is simply following a person while
she moves around. Tailing someone usually happens covertly and is generally
limited to public and publicly available places, since following someone into private
spaces would often be noticeable by the followed person and thus thwart the
purpose of tracking someone’s movement pattern. Since this form of tracking is
physical and involves close proximity between the follower and the followed,
tracking is closely related to visual observation; consequently, most jurisdictions
regulate tracking in the same way as visual observation.
Human observation is generally considered only a minor privacy intrusion, or
sometimes even no intrusion, across the jurisdictions we studied. Poland provides
the widest scope to the police, allowing human observation in publicly accessible
places without approval of a prosecutor or court and without formal time limits72;
also, use of perception-enhancing devices and even visual and aural recordings are
allowed with no additional requirements compared to naked-eye observation.73
Similarly, in Czechia, there are no time or approval restrictions on human
observation by police.74 Although the law distinguishes observation using
perception-enhancing tools that enable observation at a distance, such as

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 at 2217 (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2012).
Id. § 3117(e)(2)(C).
See, e.g., id. § 3117(d)(1).
Police Act (Art. 15/1990) (Pol.).
Id. Art. 15(5a).
Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure Code], Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb. § 158d(1) (Czech).
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binoculars,75 from classical physical observation by police officers,76 there is legally
no difference between the two forms. However, in contrast to Poland, Czech law
requires written approval of the prosecutor if recordings are made of what is being
observed.77
U.K. law does not distinguish between naked-eye observation and recording,
but it instead applies criteria of covertness and focus. Visual observation, whether
accomplished by the unaided eye or through the use of video surveillance cameras,
is subject to RIPA’s authorisation requirements only when it is covert78 and carried
out as part of a specific investigation into a person or group of persons (i.e.,
“directed” surveillance).79 However, as in Poland, authorisation from a prosecutor
or judge is not needed. Instead, approval can be obtained from a designated official
of a public body, which can be an appointee within the police services, usually a
superintendent.80
Poland and Czechia apply stricter conditions when people are observed or
followed in non-public places.81 The U.K. also applies stricter conditions for
observation in residential premises, which is termed “intrusive surveillance,”82
limiting it to cases where the surveillance is necessary for the purpose of preventing
or detecting serious crime,83 and requiring permission by a higher authority
(including a chief constable), although not a judicial one.84

75. Šámal, supra note 25, at 2004.
76. Id. at 2005.
77. Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure Code], Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb. § 158d(2) (Czech).
78. As defined in Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23, § 26(9)(a) (UK),
surveillance is covert “if, and only if, it is carried out in a manner that is calculated to ensure that persons
who are subject to the surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking place.”
79. Exceptions to the authorization requirement apply in emergencies or other situations where
obtaining an authorization is unpractical, among other situations. See HOME OFFICE, supra note 59, at
18–25.
80. Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence
Sources) Order 2010, § 30 (UK).
81. Police Act (Art. 19/1990) (Pol.) (requiring judicial authorization for observation and
recording of people’s image in dwellings, means of transport and non-public places. The application
for judicial authorization must be submitted by a public prosecutor); Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure
Code], Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb. § 158d(3) (Czech) (requiring judicial authorization if the observation
interferes with the inviolability of the home, and allowing entry of dwellings only to place technical
devices).
82. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, § 26(3) (UK) (defining covert
surveillance as intrusive when “carried out in relation to anything taking place on any residential
premises or in any private vehicle; and [involving] the presence of an individual on the premises or in
the vehicle or [being] carried out by means of a surveillance device”). Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, § 26(5) (UK) specifies that surveillance is not intrusive if it “is carried out
without [the surveillance] device being present on the premises or in the vehicle,” but will be considered
intrusive if “the device is such that it consistently provides information of the same quality and detail
as might be expected to be obtained from a device actually present on the premises or in the vehicle.”
83. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, § 32(3)(b) (UK).
84. Intrusive surveillance requires authorization from a “senior authorising officer” (Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, § 32(1) (UK)), which is usually a chief constable of police
(Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ch. 23, § 32(6) (UK)).
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Rather similarly, but applying a more flexible yardstick, Canadian and U.S. law
consider visual observation by the police—including the use of technical devices—
to constitute an unreasonable search only when it intrudes upon a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.85 Visual surveillance in public places to track a
suspect is generally considered reasonable, because—as one Quebec court put it—
such a suspect cannot expect any privacy or intimacy there (“ne pouvait prétendre
à aucun droit d’intimité”),86 or, in the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ terms,
“[t]he use of video equipment and cameras to record activity visible to the naked
eye does not ordinarily violate the Fourth Amendment.”87 This conclusion is
supported by lower court decisions in Canada holding that no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in the entrance lobby of an apartment building88 or in
the public areas of a public bathroom.89 However, a reasonable expectation of
privacy does exist in a closed bathroom stall in a public bathroom (unless the
suspect exposes himself under the dividing wall so that he is visible from the public
areas, in which case any subjective expectation of privacy becomes unreasonable).90
Similarly, U.S. courts have held that a person cannot maintain a legitimate
expectation of privacy in activities that occur outside their home and that are visible
to any passersby (for example, from a public road or sidewalk).91 However, under
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States, observation conducted by the
use of a device that is “not in general public use, to explore details of the home that

85. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (“A person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another.”); R. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (Can.).
86. R. v. Joyal, [1995] 43 C.R. 4th 317 (Can.) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
entrance lobby of an apartment building).
87. United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1280 (10th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds,
531 U.S. 1033 (2000).
88. R. v. Silva, [1995] 26 O.R. 3d 554 (Can.).
89. R. v. LeBeau, [1988] CanLII 3271 (ON CA) (Can.).
90. Id. ¶¶ 49–52.
91. United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2016) (“There is no Fourth
Amendment violation, because Houston had no reasonable expectation of privacy in video footage
recorded by a camera that was located on top of a public utility pole and that captured the same views
enjoyed by passersby on public roads.”); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“The
Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement
officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere
fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an
officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the
activities clearly visible.”). However, in at least one district court, a trial judge has found that
extended and warrantless video surveillance of a home can violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025
EFS (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014) (“[S]ociety expects that law enforcement’s continuous and covert
video observation and recording of an individual’s front yard must be judicially approved . . . .”).
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would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion”92 could be
considered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.93
Italy applies a largely similar framework, since tracking a suspect’s movements
by pedinamento (tailing, etymologically suggesting “following on foot”94) falls under
the ordinary activities that the police can do without further specific statutory rules
or safeguards, at least in public places;95 additional conditions apply only if the
tracking interferes with constitutional rights. Limitations apply particularly if visual
recordings are made of a followed person in non-public places. Such recordings
cannot be made at all in homes,96 while they can be made in so-called “reserved
places” that are not homes but nevertheless carry a reasonable expectation of
privacy: “[I]f a public toilet or a cubicle such as those at issue are not a domicile,
they are nevertheless a place which should protect the intimacy and the privacy of
the persons, and therefore for the purposes of visual recordings they cannot be
treated as a public place or a place exposed to the public.”97 Visual recordings in
such reserved places can be made, but only with a motivated decree by a judicial
authority, which can be a judge or a public prosecutor.98
While the jurisdictions discussed so far distinguish between observation in
public and in non-public places, and to some extent depend on the nature of
technical devices used, Dutch law employs a more abstract distinction, namely

92. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
93. This might include, for example, the use of through-the-wall radar or WiFi signal analysis
software, each of which could track movements through walls of a home or other constitutionally
protected areas.
94. CLAUDIO MARINELLI, INTERCETTAZIONI PROCESSUALI E NUOVI MEZZI DI RICERCA
DELLA PROVA 227 (2007).
95. CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 55 (It.)
(defining the task of the police to “conduct the activities necessary to secure the sources of evidence”),
CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] arts. 347–348 (It.)
(requiring police to report without delay notices of crime to the public prosecutor, and continuing with
the activities mentioned in article 55, collecting in particular every element useful to reconstruct the fact
and to identify the perpetrator), and CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P] [CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE] art. 370 (It.) (allowing the public prosecutor to avail himself of the judicial police to
conduct investigative and specifically delegated acts).
96. Cass., sez. un., 28 luglio 2006, Dir. pen. proc., 2006, 1349 et seq. (It.). The constitutional
protection of domiciles (Art. 14 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.)) serves to protect not only the right to include
or exclude others from entering the place; it also protects “an intangible sphere of privacy [riservatezza],
which can also be harmed—through technical devices—without the necessity of physical intrusion,”
according to GIUSEPPE TABASCO, PROVE NON DISCIPLINATE DALLA LEGGE NEL PROCESSO
PENALE. LE ‘PROVE ATIPICHE’ TRA TEORIA E PRASSI 155 (2011). To infringe this sphere, the
Constitution requires a legal basis and a stipulation of legal guarantees, and since these do not exist in
Italian law for visual recordings in domiciliary places, the Supreme Court concluded that this is not
allowed.
97. CORRADO RIZZO, LO STRUMENTO INVESTIGATIVO DELLE RIPRESE VISIVE 48–49
(2012), referring to Cass., sez. un., 28 luglio 2006, Dir. pen. proc., 2006 (It.). The ground for protecting
reserved places that are not domiciles is article 2 of the Constitution, which includes the general right
to privacy. Id.
98. RIZZO, supra note 97, at 49.
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between “systematic” and “non-systematic” forms of observation or tracking.99
Non-systematic observation can be based on the general task description of the
police without particular conditions,100 while systematic observation requires an
order of the public prosecutor.101 The conceptualisation of “systematicness” is the
closest that the Dutch lawmaker has come to defining or describing privacy, so it is
illuminating to study this criterion in some depth. The generally used definition of
systematicness is that it results in “a more or less complete image being obtained of
certain aspects of someone’s [private] life.”102 Legislative history, case law, and
doctrine mention various factors that influence the intensity of the observation and
thus, qualification of an observation as systematic. They are neither necessary nor
sufficient conditions: generally, a combination of factors will be decisive.103 The
main factors are:104 1) use of a technical device that goes beyond binoculars and
similar ordinary perception-enhancing devices, such as recording devices;105 2) place
(observation in public places is a lesser interference than observation in closed or
intimate places);106 3) intrusiveness, continuity or frequency (the closer, deeper, and
more frequent the observation, the higher its intensity; continuous observation will
be more intrusive than observation with intervals);107 4) duration (the longer the
observation, the higher the intensity);108 and, possibly, 5) the degree of suspicion
against the observed person (which might influence the reasonable expectation
someone may hold not to be observed by the police).109 Although analysis using

99. Note, however, that Dutch law generally prohibits visual recordings inside the home
(although allowing it in other non-public places). See Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 71
(Neth.). Hence, the distinction between systematic and non-systematic observation comes on top of
the basic distinction between homes and non-homes as observation sites.
100. Wet van 12 juli 2012, Stb. 2012, Art. 3 (Neth.).
101. Art. 126g(1), SV (Neth.).
102. Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3, 26–27 (Neth.). This explanatory memorandum
used the term “someone’s life,” but it is generally presumed that this refers to someone’s “private life.”
See, e.g., T. Blom, Comment No. 2 on Art. 126g, in TEKST & COMMENTAAR STRAFVORDERING
(C.P.M. Cleiren, J.H. Crijns & M.J.M. Verpalen eds., 11th ed. 2015).
103. Blom, supra note 102, comment 4(d–e).
104. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Criminal Investigation and Privacy in Dutch Law 29 (Tilburg
Univ. TILT L. & Tech. Working Paper Series, version 1.0, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2837483
[ https://perma.cc/V23X-DZEF ] at 29, for a more detailed overview.
105. The only exception is taking a few photographs, which is considered non-systematic. Blom,
supra note 102, comment 4(e).
106. Observation of a suspect’s behavior in public (such as painting graffiti) does not see to
“a situation in which the suspect could expect to be able to be himself uninhibitedly.” HR 20 april 2004,
NJ 2004, 525 (Neth.).
107. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, no. 7, 49 (Neth.).
108. Duration seems altogether less relevant than the other factors: a short observation with a
device in an intimate place, such as a brothel, is systematic (Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, no. 7, 47
(Neth.)), but an observation over a period 27 months in which the suspect was observed 60 times in
public spaces (mainly by humans, although also by one static camera aimed at someone else’s dwelling)
was not systematic (HR 18 mei 1999, NJ 2000, 104 (Neth.)).
109. Although not usually mentioned in textbooks, some case law has indicated that the degree
of suspicion needs to be taken into account in determining whether an observation makes a more than
limited infringement on privacy. Hoge Raad 10 april 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB0970 (Neth.).
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these factors leads to a more fine-grained assessment of privacy intrusions, Dutch
law is similar to the above-mentioned jurisdictions in that even systematic
observation is considered a relatively unobtrusive investigation power—the only
real limitation is that a prosecutor’s (but not a court’s) authorization is needed for
systematic observation.110
This contrasts to German law, which is the outlier in our jurisdictions as it has
far stricter limitations to human observation. Only limited forms of tracking can be
conducted by the police without a warrant: the observation has to take place outside
the home and—the strongest limitation—can only be conducted for a maximum of
24 hours.111 Observations longer than 24 hours require a court warrant.112 This
suggests that location tracking and visual observation, including in public space, are
considered substantially more privacy-intrusive in Germany than in the other
jurisdictions we studied. The need for adopting specific, and stricter, regulation of
longer-term observation in Germany is its perceived potential for considerably
interfering with the general personality right and the right to self-determination.113
Especially in cases where such observation is combined with technical means, it can
lead to such an accumulation of investigative means that a clear personality profile
of the observed person is created, which intensively interferes with the right to
informational self-determination.114 Due to this potentially high intrusiveness,
judicial authorization is required for longer-term observations.115
B. GPS Tracking
In most jurisdictions, GPS tracking is considered a form of, or an investigatory
method analogous to, observation, as it involves observing the movements of a
person or an object. In this section, we discuss differences and similarities between
the regulation of GPS tracking and human observation in our jurisdictions.
1. Mainstream: Not More Intrusive than Human Observation
By and large, the jurisdictions we studied consider GPS tracking to be about
as intrusive as (technology-facilitated) human observation. Czech and Italian law do
not distinguish between the two forms at all and apply the same conditions. In the
words of the Italian Supreme Court, GPS tracking is “a modality, technologically
typified, of tailing.”116 Dutch law applies the same framework to both forms,117
implying that GPS tracking can be equally, more, or less intrusive than human

110.
111.
112.
113.

Art. 126g(1), SV (Neth.).
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] §§ 161, 163 (Ger.).
Id. § 163f(3).
KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [KARLSRUHER
COMMENTARY ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 163f (Ger.).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Cass., sez. un., 27 febbraio 2002, no. 16130 (It.).
117. Art. 126g(1), SV (Neth.).
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observation, depending on the type of device, duration, intensity, and places of
observation.
Somewhat similarly, GPS tracking can be more or less intrusive than
“ordinary” surveillance under U.K. law, depending on the circumstances. On the
one hand, GPS tracking of cars is regulated as “intrusive surveillance” (subject to
heightened regulation) if it is “carried out in relation to anything taking place . . . in
any private vehicle” and involves the use of a surveillance device in a vehicle.118 On
the other hand, otherwise intrusive surveillance that only involves the use of a
surveillance device designed or adapted solely to provide information about the
location of a vehicle (and that does not involve physical trespass) is not considered
intrusive.119 The relevant code of practice also presumes that such use of a
surveillance device, on its own, may not always constitute directed surveillance, as
it may not result in capturing private information about an individual.120 As such,
the limited use of such a tracking device by itself (e.g., to determine the location of
a vehicle at one given point in time) may not be subject to regulation at all.
However, when the use of the device (including when it is used in conjunction with
other forms of investigatory activities) is likely to result in capturing private
information (e.g., “monitoring . . . the movements of the occupant(s) of [a]
vehicle”), the surveillance must be authorized as a form of directed surveillance
under RIPA.121
This nuanced regulation of GPS tracking of vehicles in the U.K. suggests, first,
that location tracking of goods is not considered privacy-relevant while location
tracking of people is privacy-relevant. Therefore, privacy relevance depends on
whether installing a tracking device on a car has the purpose of following the car or
its occupants—a distinction that may be hard to make in practice. Second, the
privacy intrusion is considered more severe if installing a GPS device involves
entering the vehicle, since this constitutes trespass. This suggests that in the U.K.,
the privacy of property or of private places is valued more strongly than the
behavioral privacy that is at issue when someone’s movements are tracked. This is
similar to Italy, where the literature on GPS tracking discusses whether the driverand-passenger compartment of a car is a place of private abode; if so, entering into
a car to place a GPS tracker would not be allowed in the absence of specific
legislation stipulating the modality and safeguards.122 A majority of scholarly
doctrine considers cars to be a place of private abode (and hence protected), while

118. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23, § 26(3) (UK).
119. Id. at c. 23, § 26(4).
120. HOME OFFICE, supra note 59, at 17 (“[T]he use of surveillance devices designed or adapted
for the purpose of providing information regarding the location of a vehicle is not considered to be
intrusive surveillance. The use of such devices alone does not necessarily constitute directed surveillance
as they do not necessarily provide private information about any individual, but sometimes only supply
information about the location of that particular device at any one time.”).
121. Id. at 18.
122. See Koops, supra note 104, at 28–29 (including references).
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a majority of case law does not.123 However, as Bene dryly observes, the discussion
is highly academic because technological evolution has enabled the placing of GPS
trackers also on the outside of vehicles, thus foregoing the problem of having to
enter a protected space.124 (To be sure, this may still constitute an interference with
property, but that is a relevant consideration only in the U.S. and the U.K.)125
The argument that GPS tracking does not interfere with the inviolability of
the home and is limited to tracking people (or objects) in public is also applied in
Germany. In an oft-cited decision, the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof)
judged that the use of GPS technology does not interfere with the constitutional
right to inviolability of the home; nor does it touch upon the inviolable core
(Kernbereich) of the private sphere or the right to informational self-determination.126
It is altogether a “lesser constitutional rights-interfering surveillance measure, for
which the required judicial control takes place in the criminal proceedings,” and it
is a proportionate interference in light of the considerable interest in investigating
and prosecuting crime.127 We see the same reasoning in U.S. case law prior to
Jones: automobiles moving about on public roads are exposed to public view and
scrutiny, thus diminishing the expectation of privacy a driver or passenger may have
in the vehicle’s location.128
While part of the debate on GPS tracking focuses on spatial privacy, another
part discusses it in the context of communicational privacy. Associating GPS
technology with cell-phones (which also have a positioning function, although not
necessarily GPS), the Italian Supreme Court observed that the constitutional right
to secrecy of communications was not at stake, since communications interception
does not include
the investigative activity conducted to follow the movements on the
territory of a person, to locate him and therefore to examine—at a
distance—not the flow of communications that he himself sends or
receives, but his presence at a specific place at a certain moment, as well as
the followed itinerary, the encounters that occurred etc.129

123. MARINELLI, supra note 94, at 248.
124. Bene, supra note 42, at 360.
125. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). In the U.K., GPS tracking will constitute
property interference if the tracking device is independently attached to property, such as a vehicle, and
sends back location data to the police; in many situations, this will require a separate authorization under
the Police Act 1997, besides a RIPA-based authorization for directed surveillance.
126. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 24, 2001, OLG DUS̈ SELDORF, 3
StR 324/00 (Ger.).
127. Id.
128. See e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153–54 & n.2 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality
opinion); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976) (“One has a lesser expectation of privacy
in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as
the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.”).
129. Cass., sez. un., 27 febbraio 2002, no. 16130 (It.).

First to Printer_Koops (Do Not Delete)

654

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

3/13/2019 10:14 AM

[ Vol. 9:635

In a similar vein, the European Court of Human Rights judged “that GPS
surveillance must be considered to interfere less with a person’s private life than,
for instance, telephone tapping,”130 and found that “GPS surveillance is by its very
nature to be distinguished from other methods of visual or acoustical surveillance
which are, as a rule, more susceptible of interfering with a person’s right to respect
for private life, because they disclose more information on a person’s conduct,
opinions or feelings.”131 In other words, because GPS tracking of a car only registers
a person’s movements (in public), it is considered less intrusive than wiretapping
and human observation, since only people’s bare location coordinates are recorded,
rather than what they do, say, or otherwise express through their conduct in situ.
In summary, the larger picture is that in statutory and case law, GPS tracking
is generally considered not more (and sometimes even less) intrusive than human
observation.
2. Undercurrent: More Intrusive than Human Observation
In contrast to the mainstream picture, we observe an undercurrent in case law,
and particularly in doctrine, that recognizes a potentially larger privacy intrusion
through GPS tracking. A relevant factor is that a GPS tracker records location with
high frequency by itself, without humans having to be close to the tracked person
or car. The GPS tracking in the Uzun case was considered acceptable partly because
it was applied only after a less intrusive measure had failed: Uzun and his accomplice
had detected and destroyed the transmitters (Peilsender) previously installed in the
car, “the use of which (other than with the GPS) necessitated the knowledge of
where approximately the person to be located could be found” and which was “less
intrusive” than GPS surveillance.132 Similarly, in the only Canadian Supreme Court
case on the constitutionality of warrantless location tracking (R. v. Wise), the court
found that a transmitter (or beeper) was only minimally intrusive because “it was
capable of giving only a very rough idea of the vehicle’s location. Certainly, it could
not be said that the device was capable of tracking the location of a vehicle at all
times.”133 Since GPS tracking is capable of just that, the Wise rationale would not
apply, and GPS tracking would therefore probably constitute an unreasonable
search in Canada, although the courts have not yet decided this specific question.
A more extensive argument has been made by the Polish District Court in
Suwałki, judging that using a GPS tracker undoubtedly led to collecting and
processing of a much larger, and more precise, set of data about the places the

130. Uzun v. Germany, App. No. 35623/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 72 (2010).
131. Id. § 52.
132. Id. § 78.
133. R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 (Can.). (finding that use of a beeper (“a low power radio
transmitter”) constituted an unreasonable search because it violated the defendant’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in the location and movements of his vehicle and because it was installed after
the expiration of a valid warrant, but that the search was “only minimally intrusive” and the tracking
evidence should not be excluded).
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observed person stayed, as well as data on how they moved in public space, than
could be obtained by direct observation.134 Therefore, it constituted a furtherreaching interference in private life.135 Additionally, the covert manner of the
operation of a GPS device, combined with the way the device communicated
(sending regular messages through a mobile phone network), constituted
operational surveillance under Article 19(3) of the Police Act (Poland), which is
subject to strict procedural requirements.136 The District Court rejected the idea
that, since anyone can observe a vehicle moving in public space, the information
obtained by GPS tracking could be seen as publicly available.137 The court
contrasted such individual bits of information that lead to no significant
conclusions about the person, with systematic collection of location data for a
longer period, which reveals where the person went, for how long, and where they
moved.138 The latter constitutes surveillance of the person and a violation of
freedoms and rights of the person.139 Interestingly, whereas the wording of Article
19(3) of the Police Act (Poland) at the time was sufficiently technology neutral
(“using technical means to covertly obtain information and evidence”) to
accommodate GPS tracking, the provision has since been split into a list of more
specific powers,140 none of which easily fits GPS tracking. It is therefore
questionable whether the new wording of Article 19 of the Police Act (Poland) on
operational surveillance, which only mentions visual and aural observation and
recording, still allows for the use of GPS trackers by police.141
Using similar arguments as the Suwałki court, Italian scholars heavily criticize
the Italian (case) law’s equation of GPS tracking with human tailing. They provide
arguments for why GPS tracking is more invasive than traditional tailing: it can be
very precise and continuous, and it can also track people in places that are not visible
or readily accessible (where human tailing would be impracticable or not allowed);142
it has fewer practical obstacles in time and space;143 and it constitutes a greater
privacy infringement than classic tailing because of the thoroughness of the
investigation and the possibility to protract it for long periods.144 On the other hand,
authors also observe that a person’s movements are tracked only when the tagged
car or object is being used, which is less frequent than continuous human tailing.145
134. II Ka 267/13 District Court Suwałki, 19 December 2013 (Pol.).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Police Act art. 19 (Pol.).
141. OPALINSKI, ROGALSKI & SZUSTAKIEWICZ, supra note 57, at 76.
142. Bene, supra note 42, at 352; Marinelli, supra note 94, at 237; Stefano Marcolini, Le cosiddette
perquisizioni on line (o perquisizioni elettroniche), CASSAZIONE PENALE 2855, 2867 (2010).
143. Marinelli, supra note 94, at 237; Marcolini, supra note 142, at 2867.
144. Daniela Gentile, Tracking satellitare mediante gps: attività atipica di indagine o intercettazione
di dati?, DIRITTO PENALE E PROCESSO 1464, 1472 (2010).
145. Bene, supra note 42, at 352.
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Moreover, physical tailing enables police to see the location of others during
meetings, which is not possible with electronic tailing unless the other persons are
also being electronically monitored.146 Overall, however, Italian authors tend to
consider GPS tracking to constitute a more serious privacy infringement than
human tailing, although still less serious than intercepting communications.
Perhaps the most forcible argumentation about the privacy infringement made
possible by GPS tracking has been made in United States v. Maynard (which later
became Jones on appeal to the Supreme Court).147 The judge stressed that the facts
of the case, which involved continuous GPS monitoring of the defendant’s vehicle
over a 28-day period, addressed the question whether “dragnet-type law
enforcement practices” such as “‘wholesale’ or ‘mass’ electronic surveillance . . .
require[ ] a warrant.”148 The judge held that prolonged GPS monitoring of a vehicle
for twenty-eight days amounted to an unreasonable search because the GPS
monitoring had obtained information that was “not exposed to the public”:
[U]nlike one’s movements during a single journey, the whole of one’s
movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the
public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is
effectively nil. Second, the whole of one’s movements is not
exposed constructively even though each individual movement is exposed,
because that whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than
does the sum of its parts.149
And, according to the judge, prolonged GPS tracking violated the defendant’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, in part because
[p]rolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by shortterm surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not
do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal
more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation.
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told
by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places over the
course of a month. The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still
more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but
that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a
different story. A person who knows all of another’s travels can deduce
whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym,
an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an
associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one
such fact about a person, but all such facts.150

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Marinelli, supra note 94, at 236–37.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 556, 558.
Id. at 558; see also infra Section III(B)(3)(b).
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
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This reasoning was later endorsed at the Supreme Court by both of the
concurring opinions in Jones.151
In this undercurrent of arguments, we see a recognition that GPS tracking may
have superficial similarities with traditional forms of location tracking but involves
a different way of tracking. The affordances of GPS differ from human observation:
in several respects, location tracking is more fine-grained, easier, and wider in scope
than human observation, while in other respects, it may be less detailed. This implies
that GPS tracking cannot easily be judged to be intrinsically more intrusive than
technology-facilitated human observation; nor, however, can it be simply equated
with traditional forms of observation. We think this is the main reason why authors,
and sometimes judges, have proposed different normative frames to evaluate the
intrusiveness of GPS tracking, such as the mosaic theory152 or a right not to be
localized153—frames that have yet to be adopted in mainstream thinking and case
law on location tracking, but that have potential for changing the legal evaluation of
GPS and other forms of tracking with different affordances than human tailing.
3. Installing GPS Trackers on (Items Worn by) Humans
Some jurisdictions apply special rules for installing and using tracking devices
on human bodies, or on items usually carried by humans, as this is considered a
graver (or different type of) privacy infringement than tracking cars or other objects.
The Netherlands has the most far-reaching limitation: technical devices for
observation purposes may not be placed on a person, except with the person’s
consent.154 “On a person” means on the body or clothes, including on items carried
in clothing, such as a lighter; a tracking device may, however, be placed on a
suitcase.155 This implies that items usually carried in clothes’ pockets, such as
smartphones, may not be tracked with a tracking device. The distinction between
items carried “on” the person and items carried “by” the person seems subtle, but
can be explained by the constitutional framework, which contains a separate
constitutional right to bodily integrity.156 Interfering with items carried “on” the
person (i.e., on the skin or in clothes) constitutes an interference with the body,
while items carried by (but not on) persons, such as bags or suitcases, do not fall

151. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at
428–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
152. See infra Section III(B)(3)(b).
153. See infra Section III(B)(3)(a).
154. CPC Art. 126g(3) (Neth.). With the Computer Crime III Act (adopted in June 2018, entry
into force 1 March 2019), an exception is made for hacked devices: the police are allowed to hack into
a device (such as a smartphone) carried on the body for the purposes of systematic observation (e.g.,
remotely install location-tracking software or malware to turn on the smartphone’s camera). See
Staatsblad 2018, 322 at 5–6 (Neth.).
155. Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, no. 3 at 71 (Neth.).
156. GW. art. 11.
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within the scope of bodily integrity.157 The prohibition of planting tracking devices
on persons is in line with how privacy is generally protected in Dutch criminal
procedure: bodily privacy is regarded as the most important aspect of privacy and
is generally more strongly protected than spatial or communicational privacy.158
The Netherlands is an outlier in this respect, however. In other jurisdictions,
persons (and items carried on persons) can be tracked, albeit sometimes under
stricter conditions than those that apply to tracking objects. In Grady v. United States,
the Court held that “a State . . . conducts a search when it attaches a device to a
person’s body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual’s
movements.”159 Therefore, a warrant is required for non-consensually installing a
tracking device on a person. In Canada, the Canadian Criminal Code distinguishes
between two types of tracking warrants.160 Parliament determined that tracking
individuals (or things “usually carried or worn by” individuals, such as cell-phones)
was more privacy-invasive than tracking vehicles or the location of transactions and
should be based on a higher standard of proof; namely, “reasonable grounds to
believe”161 rather than “reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been or will
be committed . . . and that tracking [an individual, thing, or transaction] will assist
in the investigation of the offence.”162 Thus, the distinction between installing
tracking devices on persons as opposed to objects is far less strict than in the
Netherlands: the U.S. has a warrant requirement for both humans and cars, while
Canada applies only a stricter condition in terms of the level of suspicion, but not
in terms of authorization.163
C. Cell-Phone Tracking
Where GPS tracking (of the sort described above, as typified by the facts of
Jones) depends on the police covertly installing a device to trace movement patterns,
a different form of location tracking uses the location data that people themselves
157. Note that placing tracking devices in items (usually) carried by persons will, nevertheless,
imply following a person, and therefore (if it crosses the threshold of systematicness) will falls under
the power of systematic observation and require a prosecutor’s order. See Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25
403, no. 7 at 48 (Neth.).
158. Koops, supra note 104 at 52.
159. Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 (2015). This did not concern criminal
investigation, but a state program that mandated satellite-based monitoring of certain recidivist sex
offenders after they had completed their sentences.
160. Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act, S.C. 2014, c 31 (Can.).
161. R.S.C. § 492.1(2) (Can.) (emphasis added).
162. Id. § 492.1(1) (emphasis added); see also R. v. Grandison, [2016] B.C.S.C. at para. 34.
163. See also T AMIR I SRAEL & C HRISTOPHER P ARSONS , 2 G ONE O PAQUE ?
A N A NALYSIS OF H YPOTHETICAL IMSI C ATCHER OVERUSE IN CANADA 69
(2016), https://citizenlab.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/20160818-Report-Gone_Opaque.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/M5D4-9QDY ] (“[D]ifferentiation between Object Tracking and Individual
Tracking Warrants may be unsustainable since both kinds of surveillance can engage roughly equivalent
privacy interests. Tracking an individual’s car, for example, can provide a comprehensive picture of that
person’s location and, over time, of their personal life as it would indicate the stores they visit, the
medical clinics they visit, the religious institutions they visit, the people they visit, etc.”).
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generate (also sometimes by GPS) through their cell-phones. The primary way that
police acquire such data is by obtaining and serving a production order on a
telecommunications provider, but this can be supplemented by other measures such
as the use of stealth SMS or IMSI catchers.164 Since cell-phones rely on cells to
communicate, and cells have a geographic position with a range of tens of miles to
some tens of yards (depending on the population density), location data from
cell-phones provide an interesting source for tracking people’s movements.
Additionally, if wireless carriers (or service providers, e.g., Google) also capture and
maintain GPS or Wi-Fi location data sourced from their subscribers’ cell-phones,
location information can be even more precise than cell site location information.
And, in contrast to the physical installation of tracking devices considered in the
previous section, accessing GPS or other location information through cell-phones
or other connected devices can be accomplished remotely, without any physical
intrusion.
In Carpenter, the U.S. Supreme Court cited its earlier decision in Riley
v. California,165 noting that tracking the location of a cell-phone presents significant
privacy concerns because cell-phones have become “almost a ‘feature of human
anatomy,’” so that “when the Government tracks the location of a cell phone it
achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the
phone’s user.”166 In the subsections that follow, we discuss the regulation of cellphone tracking in the jurisdictions in our sample.
1. Production Order to Telecoms Providers of Cell Phone Location Data
a. Historical Data
All jurisdictions in our study consider cell-phone location data to be part of,
or similar to, the metadata (or traffic data) that can be requested from telecoms
providers,167 and generally, these jurisdictions treat metadata as less privacy164. See Brad Heath, Police Secretly Tracking Cellphones to Solve Routine Crimes, USA TODAY,
Aug. 23, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police-stingray-cellsurveillance/31994181/ [ https://perma.cc/2GJZ-DD7Y ] .
165. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
166. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484);
see also discussion infra Section II(C)(1)(a).
167. See, e.g., s. 66(3) of Act No. 273/2008 Sb. on the Police (Czech) (mentioning location data
alongside traffic data that can be requested from public communications providers); CPC art. 254-bis
(It.) (including location data (data di ubicazione) among the data stored with informatics, telematics, and
telecommunications providers that can be acquired through seizure); art. 2 Besluit vorderen gegevens
telecommunicatie 2004, Stb. 2004, 394 (Neth.) (including cell location in the mobile network among
traffic data of which production can be ordered); Judgement of the Constitutional Court, 30 July 2014,
sign. K 23/11, OTK ZU 2014, nr 7, poz. 180 (Pol.) (including data allowing the identification of the
geographical location of the communication parties among metadata); United States v. Carpenter, 819
F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) (obtaining cell tower locational data from defendants’ wireless carrier is similar
to obtaining metadata as regulated by the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.); RIPA
§ 21(6)(a) (Eng.) (defining location data as within the definition of “traffic data,” which is obtainable
subject to “authorisation” under RIPA § 23). For additional analysis of UK law, see SIMON MCKAY,
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sensitive than communications content.168 As a result, not all jurisdictions require a
warrant for a location-data or metadata production order. A warrant is required to
acquire historical CSLI in Germany169 and—after Carpenter—in the U.S. In Czechia,
a warrant is required for traffic data “that are subject to telecommunications secrecy
or the protection of personal and intermediation data,”170 but not for traffic and
location data that are not subject to such protection—these latter data can be
ordered by the police.171 In Canada, a production order can be given to telecom
providers to disclose historical tracking data, which requires authorization by a
justice or judge and “reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been or will
be committed . . . and the tracking data is in the person’s possession or control and
will assist in the investigation of the offence.”172
In contrast, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland consider authorization from a
public prosecutor sufficient.173 Moreover, the Italian Supreme Court has also ruled
that the absence of an authorisation from a public prosecutor does not render
produced traffic data unusable as evidence, given the limited intrusion into the
private sphere and given that it does not fall under the strict norms for
interception.174
In the U.S., the legal status of CSLI changed considerably with Carpenter. In
prior cases involving police accessing historical location information from cellular
service providers under the Stored Communications Act,175 courts generally held
that no search had occurred, citing the third-party doctrine and equating location
information with non-content information (such as that captured by pen registers)
that attracts lesser constitutional protection.176 Under the Stored Communications

COVERT POLICING: LAW AND PRACTICE 127–29 (2nd ed., Oxford University Press 2015). Note that
Canada has separate powers for the production of transmission data (i.e., metadata) (section 487.016
CC) and production of tracking data (i.e., location data) (section 487.017 CC), but the requirements are
the same and both orders use the same form (Form 5.007).
168. See, e.g., Cass., Sez. V, 10 marzo 2010, n. 9667 (It.), as discussed in Gentile, supra note 144
(holding that obtaining traffic data constitutes a limited intrusion into the private sphere and does not
fall under the strict norms for interception); Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 989, No. 3 at 19
(Neth.) (holding that there is no justification to accord all traffic data the same level of constitutional
protection as communications content); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (finding
numbers dialed on a phone less protection-worthy than content).
169. CPC § 100g juncto §§ 101a, 100e (Ger.); see also Benjamin Vogel, Patrick Köppen & Thomas
Wahl, Germany, in ACCESS TO TELECOMMUNICATION DATA IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 499, 545 (Ulrich
Sieber & Nicolas von zur Mühlen eds., 2016).
170. CPC § 88a(1) (Czech).
171. § 66(3) Act No 273/2008 Sb. on the Police (Czech); see Radim Polcák, Czech Republic
Slovakia, in ACCESS TO TELECOMMUNICATION DATA IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 387 (Ulrich Sieber and
Nicolas von zur Mühlen eds., 2016).
172. CC [CRIMINAL CODE] § 487.017 (Can.).
173. DATA PROTECTION ACT Art. 132(3) (It.); CPC art. 126n(1) (Neth.); CPC art. 218(1) (Pol.).
174. Cass., Sez. V, 10 marzo 2010, n. 9667, as discussed in Gentile, supra note 144.
175. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.
176. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that government did not
conduct a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes when it obtained cell tower locational data from
defendants’ wireless carrier—based on the non-content/metadata distinction and the third-party
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Act, the government could access such records so long as it demonstrated
“reasonable grounds” to believe that the records were “relevant and material to an
ongoing investigation,”177 a lesser standard than the probable cause required for a
warrant. (Note, however, that at the state level, a warrant may have been required
for obtaining some cell-phone location information, even prior to Carpenter.)178
However, in Carpenter, a majority of the Supreme Court held that “the ability
to chronicle a person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone
signals” provided police with information that was “detailed, encyclopedic, and
effortlessly compiled”179—thus implicating Fourth Amendment scrutiny. In doing
so, the Court ruled that police could not rely on less-demanding court orders under
the Stored Communications Act to acquire such information from service providers
and that the third-party doctrine did not apply to the acquisition of historical
CSLI.180 In fact, the Court noted that “historical cell-site records present even
greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle we considered
in Jones,”181 precisely because,
[u]nlike the bugged container in Knotts or the car in Jones, a cell phone . . .
tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner. While individuals
regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones with them
all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public
thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.182
Besides authorization requirements, some jurisdictions limit the power to
order location-data production to relatively serious crimes: crimes with a maximum
penalty of at least three (Czechia) or four (Netherlands) years’ imprisonment, or
serious crimes (Germany).183 Other jurisdictions, however, have no such limitation
in type or seriousness of offenses.

doctrine); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (stating that cell-site tracking without
a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment due to the third-party doctrine), overruling United
States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015)
(obtaining CSLI under the SCA not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes), overruled 754
F.3d 1205 (2014).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
178. Peter Cihon, Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the States: 2015, ACLU
(Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/status-location-privacy-legislation-states2015 [ https://perma.cc/QT6Q-3WVP ] (mentioning six states protecting both historical and real-time
location information from warrantless search).
179. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018).
180. Id. at 2217.
181. Id. at 2218.
182. Id. (citations omitted).
183. Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure Code], Zákon č. 88a/2012 Sb. (Czech) (for traffic data
that are subject to the protection of personal and intermediation data); STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG
[StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 100g (Ger.) (translation at The German Code of
Criminal Procedure StPO, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ,
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/index.html [ https://perma.cc/D46U-V3KD]
( last visited Feb. 3, 2019)); Art. 126n para. 1 Sv (Neth.).
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Overall, then (with notable exceptions), a production order for location data
seems to constitute a moderate to intermediate form of privacy intrusion—certainly
not negligible, but also definitely not as intrusive as communications interception.
This state of the law is criticized by general literature arguing that the distinction
between metadata and content is outdated (in the normative sense, since collecting
metadata can be at least as intrusive as interception)184 and specific literature
claiming that national law on traffic data collection has too few safeguards.185
However, with few exceptions,186 such criticism has not yet induced lawmakers or
judges to revise the way they assess the intrusiveness of metadata production orders.
Specifically, for location metadata (as opposed to metadata in general), some
courts have advanced interesting arguments to assess the privacy intrusion, also in
comparison with other forms of tracking. As framed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Carpenter (using reasoning drawn from the concurring opinions in Jones), historical
CSLI
provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts. As with
GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into
a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through

184. See, e.g., BERT-JAAP KOOPS & JAN SMITS, VERKEERSGEGEVENS EN ARTIKEL 13
GRONDWET, EEN TECHNISCHE EN JURIDISCHE ANALYSE VAN HET ONDERSCHEID TUSSEN
VERKEERSGEGEVENS EN INHOUD VAN COMMUNICATIE 140–41 (2014) (arguing that traffic data
provide ever more insight into private life and that there is less reason nowadays to protect (only or
particularly) communications content); Bryce Clayton Newell & Joseph T. Tennis, Me, My Metadata,
and the NSA: Privacy and Government Metadata Surveillance Programs, in ICONFERENCE 2014
PROCEEDINGS 345, 346 (2014) (“[M]etadata surveillance can be highly intrusive to personal privacy –
even more revealing than the content of our communications in some cases . . . .”); Sophie StallaBourdillon, Evangelia Papadaki & Tim Chown, Metadata, Traffic Data, Communications Data, Service
Use Information. . . What Is the Difference? Does the Difference Matter? An Interdisciplinary View from
the UK, in DATA PROTECTION ON THE MOVE 437, 461 (Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes & Paul De
Hert eds., 2016) (arguing that application-level metadata should be protected in the same way as
communications content); Vogel et al., supra note 169, at 515–16 (observing that “traffic data serve to
paint an ever clearer picture of communication participants” and that “the access to mere traffic data
(without even targeting communication content) is in and of itself viewed as a significant encroachment
on the secrecy of telecommunication”). But see Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the
Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1029 (2010) (arguing that the content/noncontent distinction “reflect[s] an essential underlying dynamic of the switch from the physical world to
the network environment” and should be confirmed in future decisions).
185. See, e.g., Filippo Raffaele Dinacci, Localizzazione attraverso celle telefoniche, in LE INDAGINI
ATIPICHE 369 (Adolfo Scalfati ed., 2014) (arguing that the Italian law, in allowing traffic data production
on the basis of art. 256 C.p.c. (It.), is effectively unconstitutional, given that a mere authorization from
the Public Prosecutor suffices and in light of the lack of any other legal safeguards); Maciej Rogalski,
Udostępnianie danych telekomunikacyjnych sądom i prokuraturom, PROKURATURA I PRAWO, 2015, no. 12,
at 68 (criticizing the Polish provisions for lack of subsidiarity requirements and for disproportionately
affecting individuals who have no connection to the crime).
186. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2206 (2018) (requiring warrants for access
to historical CSLI and ruling that the third-party doctrine does not apply to such data); U.S. v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties. . . . This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”).
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them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.
These location records hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of life.’ And
like GPS monitoring, cell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, and
efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With just the click of
a button, the Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of
historical location information at practically no expense.187
In finding a greater privacy intrusion that necessitated greater protection for
location information (in relation to other forms of metadata), the Carpenter court
specifically addressed how “the retrospective quality” of CSLI could provide the
police with
access to a category of information otherwise unknowable. In the past,
attempts to reconstruct a person’s movements were limited by a dearth of
records and the frailties of recollection. With access to CSLI, the
Government can now travel back in time to retrace a person’s
whereabouts, subject only to the retention polices [sic] of the wireless
carriers, which currently maintain records for up to five years.188
Additionally, the Court repeatedly noted its assessment that CSLI granted law
enforcement something akin to “perfect surveillance”:189
[B]ecause location information is continually logged for all of the 400
million devices in the United States—not just those belonging to persons
who might happen to come under investigation—this newfound tracking
capacity runs against everyone. Unlike with the GPS device in Jones, police
need not even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular
individual, or when. Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively
been tailed every moment of every day for five years, and the police may—
in the Government’s view—call upon the results of that surveillance
without regard to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Only the few
without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.190
Even prior to Carpenter, other courts had compared CSLI to GPS and other
forms of tracking. For example, in 2010, a district judge in the Southern District of
Texas compared historical CSLI to GPS tracking.191 Acknowledging differences in
timing (CSLI being recorded historical data, GPS tracking involving prospective
data) and initiative (the police being responsible for creating GPS data, but not for
creating historical CSLI data), the Texas judge considered CSLI to be more invasive
than GPS in that it could also monitor indoors (in contrast to GPS tracking of cars)
and reveal more since the cell-phone is carried on the person.192 As a result, and

187. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18 (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 2218.
189. Id. at 2210.
190. Id. at 2218.
191. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone
Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 505–06 (2012) (referring to In re U.S. for
Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010)).
192. Id.
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following Maynard’s reasoning, the judge held that (even imprecise and intermittent)
warrantless CSLI was unconstitutional.193 Under state law (involving higher
protection than the Fourth Amendment), the New Jersey Supreme Court observed,
in 2013, that “[w]ith increasing accuracy, cell phones can now trace our daily
movements and disclose not only where individuals are located at a point in time
but also which shops, doctors, religious services, and political events they go to, and
with whom they choose to associate.”194 Thus, “the cell site locations of telephone
calls made and received may yield a treasure trove of very detailed and extensive
information about the individual’s ‘comings and goings’ in both public and private
places.”195
b. Future Data, or Real-Time Cell Phone Location Tracking
Most jurisdictions in our study not only allow police, through the collection of
cell-phone location data, to acquire historical traffic data (i.e., data about
movements in the past), but they also allow police to acquire future or real-time
traffic data (i.e., data about future movements, usually under the same, or only
slightly stricter, conditions). This turns a data production order into a power
analogous to covert surveillance to track a person’s movements, such as tailing or
GPS tracking.
For instance, Dutch electronic communications providers can be ordered to
produce incoming, future data for a period of up to three months, which have to
be provided real-time.196 (This applies, however, only to location data when the
phone is used for an actual or attempted communication and not to location data
generated when the phone is merely in stand-by mode.)197 Similarly, the German
provision on location-data production includes the situation that location data are
provided in real time, in cases of serious crime and if it is necessary for the
investigation,198 and the Czech provision on traffic and location data requests by
police can involve “remote and continuous access.”199
While these countries treat real-time cell-phone location tracking under the
general power for real-time provisioning of cell-phone metadata, Canada separates
these explicitly.200 Bill C-13 from 2014 removed “location” from the power to
193. Id.
194. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013) (quoted in Susan Freiwald, Light in the
Darkness: How the LEATPR Standards Guide Legislators in Regulating Law Enforcement Access to Cell
Site Location Records, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 877, 883 (2014)).
195. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 863 (Mass. 2014) (quoted in Freiwald, supra
note 194, at 883–84).
196. Art. 126n ¶¶ 1–3 Sv (Neth.).
197. Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 059, No 3 at 8 (Neth.). Location data of phones in stand-by
mode might be requested on the basis of art. 126ng Sv (Neth.), but this applies only to stored data, not
to real-time provisioning of incoming location data.
198. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 100g, para. 1
(Ger.) (translation at The German Code of Criminal Procedure StPO, supra note 183).
199. Zákon o Policii České republiky [Police Act], Zákon č. 273/2008 Sb., § 66(3) (Czech).
200. See Israel & Parsons, supra note 163, at 66.

First to Printer_Koops (Do Not Delete)

2019]

LOCATION TRACKING BY POLICE

3/13/2019 10:14 AM

665

obtain transmission data and explicitly prohibits its use as a tracking power;201
instead, location data are included in the “more protective”202 power to obtain
tracking data.203 A tracking warrant “may contain any conditions that the justice or
judge considers appropriate, including conditions to protect a person’s
interests”204—a provision that the transmission data recording warrant lacks. A
tracking warrant targeted at a specific individual, for “identifying the location of a
thing that is usually carried or worn by the individual,” applies a higher standard of
proof205 than the standard for transmission-data warrants or for tracking warrants
targeted at transactions or things. A tracking warrant can be combined with an
“assistance order”206 designed to ensure, for example, that a telecommunications
provider assist law enforcement in tracking a device, such as a cell-phone, by
providing data or access to data required for such purposes.
In the United States, CSLI can also be ordered in real time—so-called
“prospective CSLI,”207 and the Carpenter court explicitly did not address real-time
CSLI.208 Some courts have held that prospective or real-time CSLI should be
granted less liberally than historical CSLI, given that Congressional intent when
passing the Stored Communications Act was more in line with historical data; other
courts have held that the two should be treated identically.209 In real-time CSLI
cases, courts have also applied the reasoning from Knotts to determine that
defendants did not have legitimate expectations of privacy in their location while
they moved about in publicly accessible places, such as public highways,210 or phone
tracking has been justified under the authority of warrants or other court orders,
and as such, has not been unreasonable.211 On the other hand, a district judge

201. Criminal Code, R.S.C.1985, c. C-46, § 492.2(3) (Can.) (“No warrant shall be issued under
this section for the purpose of obtaining tracking data.”).
202. ISRAEL & PARSONS, supra note 163, at 68.
203. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 492.1 (Can.). See R. v. Grandison, 2016 BCSC
1712 (Can. B.C.) and surrounding text.
204. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 492.1(4) (Can.).
205. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 492.1(1)–(2) (Can.); Grandison, 2016 BCSC at
para. 34 and surrounding text.
206. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 487.02 (Can.).
207. Rothstein, supra note 191, at 494 (referring to In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data,
747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835–36 (S.D. Tex. 2010)).
208. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“Our decision today is a narrow
one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download
of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval).”).
209. Rothstein, supra note 191, at 505.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004) (interception of cellular phone
data revealed defendant’s general location while traveling on public highways. The Court applied Knotts,
finding “no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell-site data because the DEA agents could have
obtained the same information by following Garner’s car”).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Luna-Santillanes, 554 F. App’x. 402 (6th Cir. 2014); see also United
States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding that exclusion of evidence was not proper remedy
for government’s failure to comply with procedural requirements for preparing, executing, and
returning a warrant for a tracking device, namely precise location information from defendant’s cell
phone).
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offered interesting arguments to support the view that prospective CSLI, if
conducted for a period of up to thirty days, is privacy-intrusive and not comparable
to surveillance of movements in public. This is so, in the judge’s view, because the
police will not know in advance whether the target is in a constitutionally protected
place, such as a home, and users tend to keep their cell-phones on (or close to) their
persons.212 And, unlike cars, “it is ‘almost unimaginable’ that a cell phone would
remain entirely within public spaces.”213 The judge also argued that, for the purposes
of arresting someone, continued tracking provides “different and arguably more”
information than a place-based search, revealing intimate details of a person’s life
that entering someone’s home need not reveal.214 In the end, however, the reasoning
in Carpenter and Jones seems to imply that the acquisition of CSLI (in any form,
historical or future) would need to be supported by a warrant because it intrudes on
reasonable expectations of privacy215—although, presumably, it may depend on the
period over which future or real-time CSLI would be collected before it equals the
broad historical “encyclopedia” of information at issue in Carpenter.
In contrast to the countries that allow prospective cell-phone location
tracking, Poland does not seem to have a provision providing a possibility for realtime collection of traffic data.216
2. Stealth SMS and GPS Ping
The usefulness of a production order of cell-phone traffic data to track
someone’s movements (or rather, their phone’s movements) is dependent on the
number of times the phone is actually used. After all, telecom providers usually only
store traffic data of actual communications (or communication attempts), and
location data of phones in stand-by mode may not be possible to collect in real time
from providers, at least in the Netherlands217 and possibly in the United States.218
(However, this may differ for other types of service providers, such as producers of
applications installed on a user’s smartphone, which might collect location data

212. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D. Md. 2011) [hereinafter Specified Wireless Tel.] (citing a
study that 65 percent of U.S. adults have slept with their phone nearby), discussed in Rothstein, supra
note 191, at 518.
213. Rothstein, supra note 191, at 519 (citing Specified Wireless Tel., supra note 212, at 543).
214. Id. at 519–20 (citing Specified Wireless Tel., supra note 212, at 550).
215. For instance, in Carpenter v. United States., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018), the court held
that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements
as captured through CSLI” does not seem to be, on its face, limited to historical CSLI.
216. ANDRZEJ ADAMSKI, CYBERCRIME LEGISLATION IN POLAND 39 (2015),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279191115_CYBERCRIME_LEGISLATION_IN_
POLAND [ https://perma.cc/KM6F-4TYE ] .
217. Kamerstukken II, supra note 197.
218. Rothstein, supra note 191, at 504 (citing a minority of courts that held that federal statute
allowed CLSI acquisition only when the target made and received calls).
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more continuously and when devices are not being used.)219 To ensure that
sufficient location data are generated to be able to track a cell-phone’s movements
with considerable precision, police have employed a method referred to as “stealth
SMS” or “silent SMS” (SMS, or short messaging service, being the original
technology used for texting).220 These stealthy text messages remain hidden from
the mobile phone’s user but do generate traffic data (since an actual
communication, albeit covert, occurs).221
Police use of stealth SMS has been discussed in Germany and the Netherlands,
and to some extent in the United States; presumably, police in other countries may
also be using this method, but it has, to our knowledge, not yet been tested in
Supreme Court cases or discussed in mainstream literature in the other jurisdictions
in our study. In Germany, it is used very frequently: several federal law-enforcement
agencies sent over 150,000 silent SMS messages in the first half of 2014 alone.222
The statutory basis for it has “not yet been conclusively settled.” However, the
discussion revolves around the question of whether, or to what extent, sections 100a
et seq. of the German Criminal Code, possibly in combination with the general
investigative clauses in section 163(1) and section 161(1), “can be used beyond their
respective wording for not only passively accessing data generated independent of
investigation authorities, but also for actively inducing such a generation of data.”223
Some authors argue that silent SMS can be based on section 100h(1)(2), which
allows special technical devices for observation purposes to be used against suspects
(or against others if there are grounds to believe they have contacts with the suspect
and the measure will lead to establishing the suspect’s location), for crimes of
substantial significance, and “silent SMS” can be interpreted as such a special
technical observation device.224
In the Netherlands, the use of stealth SMS to locate a suspect is also
“frequently” used.225 It has been accepted on the basis of Article 3 of the Police Act
of 2012—the general task description of the police, on which minor privacy
219. See e.g., Keith Collins, Google Collects Android Users’ Locations Even When Location Services
Are Disabled, QUARTZ (Nov. 21, 2017), https://qz.com/1131515/google-collects-android-userslocations-even-when-location-services-are-disabled/ [ https://perma.cc/G8QC-7CQA].
220. See Text Messaging, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Text_messaging
[ https://perma.cc/V6Y8-LQSH] ( last visited Feb. 3, 2019); SMS, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/SMS [ https://perma.cc/4TTN-YNA6 ] ( last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
221. See Vogel et al., supra note 169, at 550–51.
222. Id. at 551 (referring to DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 18/2257, 9
(Ger.)).
223. Id. at 551; Ulrich Eisenberg & Tobias Singelnstein, Zur Unzulässigkeit der heimlichen
Ortung per „stiller SMS”, 25 NSTZ NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 62 (2005) (observing that
generation of the data is the core feature of the measure of silent SMS, as this enables creating a precise
movement profile independent from the user’s behavior, and arguing that the measure for this reason
is intrusive and lacks the required specific legal basis).
224. Sigrid Hegmann, StPO § 100h Weitere Maßnahmen außerhalb von Wohnraum, in BECKOK
STPO WITH RISTBV AND MISTRA, para. 6 ( Jürgen Peter Graf et al. eds., 30th ed. 2018) (Ger.).
225. G. ODINOT ET AL., HET GEBRUIK VAN DE TELEFOON- EN INTERNETTAP IN DE
OPSPORING 131 (2012).
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intrusions can be based without a specific statutory basis in the Code of Criminal
Procedure.226 The Supreme Court has deemed stealth SMS to involve a minor
privacy intrusion.227 The circumstances of the case are relevant, however, given that
the Court argued that the duration and frequency (ninety messages in five days)
were such as to create only a limited image of the phone user’s movements.
Additionally, the court stated, there was authorization from the public prosecutor
and an order for systematic observation and communications interception had
already been given to enable other investigation methods. And, despite flaws in
reporting, sufficient clarity had been acquired about how the method had been
used.228 In other situations—for instance, if used for a longer period or with very
high frequency—use of stealth SMS is likely to be deemed to constitute more than
only a minor privacy intrusion, given that someone’s movements recorded over a
longer period of time or with very high frequency are likely to result in a more or
less complete image of certain aspects of someone’s private life.229 Therefore, in
these circumstances, the public prosecutor would be required to authorize an order
for systematic observation (Article 126g of the Dutch Criminal Code) or, in the
proposed new Code, an order for systematic determination of location.230
In the United States, a slightly different form is discussed in the literature, in
which law enforcement obtains a court order to have a service provider “ping” a
cellular phone at particular times or intervals that enables the provider to calculate
the phone’s location based on its GPS coordinates, which are more precise than
ordinary cell-site information.231 In multiple cases, the Sixth Circuit has held that
pinging GPS coordinates of a phone is not a Fourth Amendment search since it
does not constitute a trespass or invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.232
Importantly, this reasoning has emerged from cases where the tracking was for a
relatively short period of time (less than that at issue in Jones). In such cases, the
third-party doctrine would also not seem to apply, since the data are generated at
law enforcement’s initiative and not voluntarily transmitted by the user.233

226. M.J. Borgers, Normering van ‘lichte’ opsporingshandelingen, 15 DELIKT & DELINKWENT
143, 143 (2015).
227. HR 1 juli 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1569 (Neth.).
228. Id. See Borgers, supra note 226, for an extensive discussion.
229. Cf. Hof ‘s-Hertogenbosch 20 juni 2013, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2013:2579 § I(D.2) (Neth.).
230. Proposed art. 2.8.2.10.1, Concept Wetsvoorstel Boek 2 (Neth.), supra note 48;
see also Memorie van Toelichting 23–24 (Feb. 2017), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/
kamerstukken/2017/02/07/memorie-van-toelichting-vaststellingswet-boek-2-van-het-nieuwe-wetboekvan-strafvordering-het-opsporingsonderzoek [ https://perma.cc/7G3V-PUAA ] (Neth.).
231. Rothstein, supra note 193, at 495.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Forest, 355
F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
233. Rothstein, supra note 193, at 510 (referring to United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951
(6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543
U.S. 1050 (2005), which determined that the third-party doctrine does not apply if police dial the
subject’s cell phone to generate CSLI).
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3. IMSI Catchers (Stingrays)
An International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catcher (sometimes also
called a Stingray) is a cell-site simulator, that is, a device that resembles a cell-phone
base station and attracts the traffic of mobile phones in its vicinity.234 It is usually
used to acquire someone’s unknown telephone number (or IMSI number) by
operating the IMSI catcher in the vicinity of the target so that the target’s phone
makes contact with the simulator (if done at a few different places, this will usually
enable uniquely identifying the target’s number). However, an IMSI catcher can also
be used to locate a suspect’s phone if the number is already known. For instance,
U.S. police used an IMSI catcher in United States v. Rigmaiden235 (a fraud case) to
trace a prepaid data card connected to a laptop, of which they only had an IP
address; the telecom provider had been able to locate the data card within a quartersquare-mile area, but could provide no more precise location, and the IMSI catcher
was used to track the card exactly to the suspect’s apartment.236
Police use of IMSI catchers is specifically regulated in Germany and the
Netherlands. Germany enables both functionalities of identifying an unknown
number237 and establishing the location of a mobile device.238 The measure requires
a warrant239 and an offense of substantial significance,240 and it can be ordered for
at most six months (which can be prolonged repeatedly with six-month periods).241
Data of third persons can only be collected if it is technically inevitable; these can
only be used for data mining to retrieve the sought-after number and must be
deleted immediately afterward.242
In the Netherlands, Article 126nb of the Dutch Criminal Code regulates use
of an IMSI catcher, but this is limited to the purpose of acquiring identification
information; Article 126nb cannot be used to collect location or other metadata. An
IMSI catcher may nevertheless also be used as a tracking device, to determine where
the phone user is located. The Supreme Court has allowed this in a specific case on
the basis of Article 3 of the Police Act of 2012 (the general provision allowing minor
privacy intrusions, without specific safeguards), in light of the short duration of its
use in the present case and the authorization of the public prosecutor, and the fact
that it only revealed the phone’s (user’s) location, but not what the user does or

234. See
IMSI-catcher, W IKIPEDIA , https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMSI-catcher
[ https://perma.cc/AK74-8AQ5 ] ( last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
235. United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012).
236. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret Stingray’s No Secret Anymore:
The Vanishing Government Monopoly Over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security
and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 29–30 (2014).
237. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 100i(1)(1) (Ger.).
238. Id. § 100i(1)(2).
239. Id. §§ 100i(3), 100b(1).
240. Id. § 100i(1).
241. Id. § 100i(3).
242. Id. § 100i(2).
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says.243 It added, however, that, in general, if the duration, intensity, and frequency
are such as to enable acquiring a more or less complete image of a part of someone’s
private life, IMSI catcher localization cannot be based on Article 3 of the Police Act
of 2012 and requires a specific statutory basis;244 this could be systematic
observation (Article 126g of the Dutch Criminal Code) or, in the proposed new
Code, an order for systematic determination of location,245 both of which require
an authorization from the public prosecutor, but not a warrant.
In other countries, IMSI catchers are also used, but the legal status is
somewhat less clear. In Czechia, IMSI catchers (nicknamed “Agáta”) seem to be
used by police, but we have not found any legal discussion of this. We assume the
measure can be based on section 158d(2) of the Czech Code of Criminal Procedure
(observation), which allows covert obtaining of information about persons and
objects by technical means.246 While this is the same type of measure as the German
provision, it requires authorization from a public prosecutor, not a judge.247
In the United States, cases challenging the use of these devices are as yet
relatively scarce. Although law enforcement has argued since 2001 that an
IMSI catcher can be based on pen register or trap and trace orders (to record
traffic data),248 several judges have denied applications because the pen/trap statute
does not see to recording traffic data from unidentified devices.249
In United States v. Patrick,250 the Seventh Circuit held that the warrantless use of an
IMSI catcher to locate a suspect with an outstanding warrant did not require
exclusion of evidence when it was used to locate the suspect in a public space.251
However, the court explicitly avoided a full analysis of whether the use of the
simulator was itself a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, leaving that analysis
for future cases.252 In another more recent Seventh Circuit case, United States
v. Sanchez-Jara,253 Judge Easterbrook held that an IMSI catcher could be effectively
authorized by a warrant under section 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act
(when issued upon a finding of probable cause), but only insofar as the device used
would not capture “information that would require a wiretap warrant” under 18

243. HR 1 juli 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1562 (Neth.). The exact duration is not mentioned in
the judgement, but was at most three days (the IMSI catcher was used on April 26, 2010 to narrow
down the geographic location of the phone, and the suspect was arrested on April 28).
244. Id.
245. Concept Wetsvoorstel Boek 2 (Neth.), supra note 48 (proposed Art. 2.8.2.10.1).
246. Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure Code], Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb., § 158d(1)–(2) (Czech).
247. Id. § 158d(2).
248. Pell & Soghoian, supra note 236, at 27.
249. Id. at 21 (referring to In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing the Use
of a Cellular Telephone Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 200 (C.D. Cal. 1995)); id. at 29 (referring to
In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register &
Trap & Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747,751 (S.D. Tex. 2012)).
250. United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2016).
251. Id. at 545.
252. Id.
253. United States v. Sanchez-Jara, 889 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2018).
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U.S.C. sections 2510–2522 (such as the contents of communications).254 In
Rigmaiden (a district court decision), the government acknowledged that an IMSI
catcher’s use to locate a data card constituted a Fourth Amendment search and had
in fact obtained a search warrant pursuant to Rule 41(b).255 Relevant in this case is
that the card turned out to be inside a residence, a possibility that law enforcement
had foreseen—as a prosecutor stated in a hearing:
It’s not the nature of the data; it’s the nature of the interest. And the—the
nature of the—the legal interests, the Fourth Amendment—you know,
where you have an expectation of privacy is where we would recommend
using the search warrant as opposed to just a pen register order.256
Indeed, as Pell and Soghoian observe, use of IMSI catchers in many cases
“necessarily involves sending signals through the walls of homes and apartment
buildings or penetrating briefcases, purses, and pockets in order to identify the
phones contained within.”257 In that light, it makes sense that the policy guidance
adopted by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2015 on IMSI catchers states that, as
a matter of policy, law enforcement must (except in emergencies or exceptional
circumstances) obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause and issued
pursuant to Rule 41 (along with pen/register authorization).258 Although the policy
states that cases of exceptional circumstances that make obtaining a search warrant
impracticable are expected “to be very limited,” and agents still need approval from
the agency’s executive-level personnel, the relevant U.S. Attorney, and a Criminal
Division DAAG,259 the “questionably broad definition of exceptional situations”
has been called a “central weakness” in the policy.260
The situation in Canada is less clear, although Canadian agencies are
apparently using IMSI catchers.261 According to Israel and Parsons, the Criminal
Code contains “a patchwork of overlapping electronic surveillance powers that
could potentially apply to IMSI Catcher use, each with varying levels of
safeguards.”262 They argue that the use of IMSI catchers is most similar to
individual-targeted tracking and should therefore comply with “Individual

254. Id. at 421 (“Given the district judge’s finding of probable cause—a finding that carries a
strong presumption of correctness this warrant suffices to support use of a cell-site simulator that does
not gather information that would require a wiretap warrant.”) (internal citations omitted).
255. Pell and Soghoian, supra note 236, at 30 (referring to United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR
08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *14 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013)).
256. Id. at 31 (quoting Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings: Motion Hearing at 61,
United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC)).
257. Id. at 32.
258. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICY GUIDANCE: USE OF CELLSITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY 3 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download
[ https://perma.cc/A7YD-RKHU ].
259. Id. at 4.
260. Israel & Parsons, supra note 163, at 54.
261. Id. at 57.
262. Id.
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Tracking” warrants, “[g]iven the capacity of IMSI Catcher-obtained data to reveal
the movements of individuals, now and in the future . . . .”263
D. Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR)
Automated license/number plate recognition (ALPR) is used in many
countries to scan license plates of cars on public roads, often on a large scale with
static cameras or mobile cameras. Images can be retained in a database for a certain
period, to enable data mining and ex post searches, or recognition can take place in
real-time based on a hit list of sought-after license plates without images being
necessarily stored.264 ALPR is used for a wide range of law enforcement and other
government purposes; we discuss here only briefly its use in criminal investigation.
In Germany, ALPR can be used to locate an accused during police checks on
the basis of section 163e of the German Criminal Code (police observation), in cases
of offenses of substantial significance and where other means of establishing the
facts or determining the perpetrator’s whereabouts would offer much less prospect
of success or be much more difficult.265 It can be used against other persons only
if it can be assumed that they are linked to the perpetrator, that the measure will
lead to determination of the perpetrator’s whereabouts, and that using other means
would offer much less prospect of success or be much more difficult.266 Additional
plates can be included in the observation if the car is registered to or used by the
accused or by a thus far not identified person who is suspected of a crime of
substantial significance.267 The use of ALPR under section 163e requires
authorization from a judge.268
In contrast to Germany, ALPR does not fall under the Dutch power of
systematic observation, as it does not involve systematic following of a person. ALPR
might be based on Article 3 of the Police Act of 2012 if the police are looking for
particular cars with known license plate numbers from a reference database, which
are automatically matched with the plate numbers of cars passing by, and the
photograph and plate number of an observed car is recorded only if a match is
found.269 The general use of ALPR cameras on highways to record passing traffic
263. Id. at 69–70; cf. the argumentation in Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance
Technology Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 109–10 (2017) (observing that “the
use of a device to force a person’s cellphone to provide the police with precise locational data—in some
cases within two meters of the cellphone—echoes similar legal debates about whether the Fourth
Amendment governs the government’s collection of vast amounts of locational data, even in public
spaces,” with reference to the concurring opinions in Jones).
264. Roger Clarke, The Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle Surveillance in
Australia (Mar. 19, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/ANPRSurv.html [ https://perma.cc/FE5D-6CZA ] (distinguishing two ANPR architectures: the “mass
surveillance” and “blacklist-in-camera” approaches).
265. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 163e(1) (Ger.).
266. Id. § 163e(1); see also Urs Kindhäuser, STRAFPROZESSRECHT § 8, Rn. 18–19 (4th ed. 2016).
267. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 163e(2) (Ger.).
268. Id. § 163e(4).
269. CORSTENS & BORGERS, supra note 47, at 333.
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is not allowed for criminal investigation purposes; it has been used in the past by
several police units, with recordings being stored for weeks or months, but the Data
Protection Authority determined that this lacked a legal basis.270 A bill is now
pending in the Senate to allow large-scale ALPR registration, with a storage period
of four weeks.271 Investigation officers would be able to consult the ALPR database
in cases that involve investigations of relatively serious crimes (generally those
carrying a maximum imprisonment of at least four years) or in cases of fugitive
suspects (this requires an order from the public prosecutor).272 In terms of privacy
safeguards, Article 5 of the proposed Order in Council to further regulate ALPR is
interesting: it stipulates that only public places can be monitored and that measures
must be taken to prevent images of car users being consulted; thus, “ANPR cameras
must be focused and fine-tuned in such a way as to prevent as much as possible the
recognizable presence of non-public places or persons on the photos of the
vehicle.”273 Since such recording could nevertheless happen, the officer accessing
the database should remove the photo or make the place or person unrecognizable
before giving it to the requesting officer.274
The possibilities for accessing the central ALPR database are considerably
broader in the U.K. Records can be kept up to two years and consulted up to 90
days after their creation for ordinary crimes—up to one year for “serious
investigations” (such as blackmail, perverting justice, or rape) or “major
investigations” (such as murder or kidnapping).275 For major investigations, records
can also be requested after one year with written authority of an inspector.276 In
Canada, ALPR data fall under the definition of “personal information” for purposes
of federal and provincial privacy acts but is generally not subject to the Canadian
Charter’s prohibitions on unreasonable searches.277 Specifically, the British
Columbia Privacy Commissioner has held that the retention (but not the initial
270. College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, Onderzoek naar de verwerking van no-hits bij de
inzet van Automatic Number Plate Recognition Regionaal politiekorps IJsselland ( Jan. 2010); College
Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, Onderzoek naar de verwerking van no-hits bij de inzet van Automatic
Number Plate Recognition Regionaal politiekorps Rotterdam-Rijnmond ( Jan. 2010).
271. Kamerstukken I 2016/17, 33 542, No. A (Neth.).
272. Id. (proposed Art. 126jj SV).
273. Art. 5(3) Besluit inzake het vastleggen en bewaren van kentekengegevens van het Wetboek
van Strafvordering door de politie (draft), Kamerstukken I 2016/17, 33 542, appendix to No. C (Neth.).
274. Id. at Art. 5(4).
275. See HOME OFFICE, NATIONAL ANPR STANDARDS FOR POLICING.
PART 3 – DATA ACCESS AND MANAGEMENT STANDARDS art. 5–6, apps. B–C (2016),
http://www.npcc.police.uk/RMH/Part3.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171222105413/http://www.npcc.police.uk/RMH/Part3.pdf].
276. Id.
277. See Bryce Clayton Newell, Local Law Enforcement Jumps on The Big Data
Bandwagon: Automated License Plate Recognition Systems, Information Privacy, And Access to Government
Information, 66 ME. L. REV. 397, 411 (2014). But see INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF
ONTARIO (ICPO), GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF AUTOMATED LICENCE PLATE RECOGNITION
SYSTEMS BY POLICE SERVICES ( 2017), https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/
alpr_systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/3URE-UR8Z ] (urging police services to ensure that their ANPR
programs respect Charter-protected privacy rights).
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collection) of certain obsolete and “non-hit” information violated provincial privacy
law.278 In the United States, a number of states have regulated the use of ALPR, but
there is no applicable federal law (including the Fourth Amendment, as long as the
scanning happens in publicly accessible places where persons are deemed to not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy) to regulate such surveillance more broadly
or consistently across the country.279
E. Other Forms of Location Tracking
While (technology-enhanced) human observation, GPS tracking, cell-phone
tracking, and ALPR are the most widely used forms of location tracking by police
in the jurisdictions we studied, law enforcement can and do use a wide variety of
other forms of tracking. In this section, we highlight some interesting alternative
tracking methods we encountered in our research, typically in the context of a
particular jurisdiction. The description here is not comparative. Rather, it is
illustrative, designed to show how specific jurisdictions incorporate new or
alternative tracking methods in their legal system.
Cars and cell-phones leave traces of people’s movements, but electronic
transactions in banks, ATMs, and shops can also provide insight into someone’s
whereabouts. The Canadian Criminal Code explicitly includes such data in the
regulation of tracking production orders;280 section 487.017 allows the police to
make ex parte applications for court orders requiring third parties to produce
documents containing tracking data, defined as “data that relates to the location of
a transaction, individual or thing.”281 Similarly, based on the Czech Police Act, police
can, without authorization, request data about time and place of used electronic
payment methods from banks or data about place and time of provided health
services from health insurance companies and healthcare providers, but only to
search for missing or searched persons, not for evidence-gathering in general.282
Although location data are not explicitly mentioned, they may also fall under the
data that can be ordered from service providers in other jurisdictions; for instance,
Dutch police can, with authorization from the Public Prosecutor and for relatively
serious crimes, order production of any data from someone likely to store it,283
which will include transaction data. If ordered data are likely to include “sensitive”
data (i.e., on religion, race, health, political views, sex life, or trade-union

278. Newell, supra note 277, at 411 (citing Elizabeth Denham, Office of Info. & Privacy
Comm’r of B.C., Investigation Report F12-04: Use of Automated Licence Plate Recognition Technology by
the Victoria Police Department 10–11 (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.oipc.bc.ca/investigation-reports/
1480 [ https://perma.cc/597B-H2LB ]); see also ICPO, supra note 277, at 9 (similar finding under
Ontario’s privacy act).
279. For a discussion and analysis of these state laws (current as of 2014), see Newell, supra note
277, at 404–10.
280. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.
281. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 487.011 (Can.) (emphasis added).
282. Zákon o Policii [Police Act], Zákon č. 273/2008 Sb., § 68 (Czech).
283. Art. 126nd SV (Neth.).
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membership), the police must obtain a warrant and the offense being investigated
must be a particularly serious crime.284
Another way to trace a known suspect whose whereabouts are unknown is the
classic method of publishing their description or picture in the hope that someone
recognizes them and asking the public to inform the police accordingly. This is
explicitly regulated in Germany, where section 131a of the German Code of
Criminal Procedure (Notice to Determine Whereabouts) allows notices to be
published in newspapers or otherwise broadcasted, in cases involving an offense of
substantial significance and a high level of suspicion (dringend verdächtig). This
measure can be used if other measures to determine the whereabouts are
considerably less likely to succeed.285 The published notice may include pictures.286
Such notices can also be used to trace witnesses, but the notice has to make clear
that the sought person is not the accused. Furthermore, witness pictures can only
be published if alternative tracking methods are hopeless or substantially more
difficult and there is an absence of preponderant protection-worthy interests of the
witness.287 Pictures can also be published on the basis of section 131b of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, particularly in cases where the suspects’ or witnesses’
identities are unknown, under generally similar conditions.288
A more recently developed method is the use of directional Wi-Fi tracking
antennas and associated software to trace unknown users of an unprotected Wi-Fi
network. In the United States, defendants in a growing number of (primarily) district
court decisions have challenged the investigatory use of this method.289
Generally, police have used these technologies to identify locations where child
pornography or other illicit material is being downloaded via Wi-Fi routers.
In United States v. Stanley,290 police knew child pornography was being shared from
a particular IP address, but a warrant-based search of the home associated with the
IP address was unsuccessful (because the suspect was “piggybacking” on an open
Wi-Fi network).291 With the consent of the homeowner, police used
MoocherHunter software, which measures the distance between the router and the
computer connecting to it, and by moving the antenna of the wireless router, police
could trace the computer to a specific apartment.292 According to the court, this did
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search since the defendant “did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the wireless signal he caused to emanate from

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Art. 126nf SV (Neth.).
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 131a(3) (Ger.).
Id. §§ 131(4), 131a(4).
Id. § 131a(4).
Id. § 131b.
See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 116–17.
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his computer.”293 Although the defendant invoked Kyllo, arguing that the software
was not in general public use and was used to discover his computer inside his
home, the court distinguished Wi-Fi tracking from thermal imaging because, in
contrast to Kyllo who did not send the heat to a third party and tried to contain it in
his garage, Stanley had “voluntarily caused a signal to be sent directly to [the]
wireless router” of a neighbor and therewith “voluntarily conveyed [the signal] to a
third party.”294 Besides using directional antennas to physically locate the source of
Wi-Fi transmissions, police have frequently located computers based on IP
addresses.295
Similarly sophisticated but more physical in character, Dutch police have
applied the so-called “flock fiber method” (flockvezelmethode) to investigate a large
number of burglaries in remotely located houses and farms.296 This involved
spraying the seats in a suspect’s car with a specially developed microfiber spray
(similar to what is called “synthetic DNA” spray)297 and a fluorescent substance; the
fibers attach themselves to the clothes of those sitting in the seats. If these fibers
(which are uniquely identifiable) are found at a crime-scene, this provides evidence
of a link between the car owner and the crime.298 The method was not
comprehensively tested in court, due to legal-technical issues; the Court of Appeal
found that the method did not infringe the right to a fair trial to such an extent that
the public prosecutor should be declared inadmissible in prosecuting the case, and
the Supreme Court agreed.299 The advocate general, in his advice to the Supreme
Court, offered an interesting reflection on this method. He argued that privacy was
not as such an issue here, given that the spray did not establish a complete trail of
movements, but only linked the suspect with the location of the crime scene, “which
is not a space where the burglar can reasonably be himself uninhibitedly.”300 Rather,
the seriousness of the method consisted, according to the advocate general, in the
intrusiveness of breaking into the car to apply the spray, which was questionable in
light of Article 3 of the Police Act of 2012 (which only allows minor privacy
intrusions) and in causing the suspect to be the carrier of artificial traces, which was
problematic in light of the regulation of systematic observation (which prohibits
putting a tracking device on a person301).302
293. United States v. Stanley, No. CRIM. 11-272, 2012 WL 55129987, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 14,
2012).
294. Id. at *16–17.
295. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 626 F. App’x 610 (6th Cir. 2015).
296. Conclusie A-G Aben 12 maart 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:229, § 3.2 (Neth.).
297. See, e.g., Francisca Grommé, Provocation: Technology, Resistance and Surveillance in Public
Space, 34 ENV’T & PLANNING D: SOC. & SPACE 1007 (2016) (discussing the introduction of a marker
spray in Dutch urban public transport to conceptualize the role of technology in everyday resistances
against surveillance).
298. Conclusie A-G Aben 12 maart 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:229, § 3.2 (Neth.).
299. HR 3 mei 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:462 (Neth.).
300. Conclusie A-G Aben 12 maart 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:229, § 4 (Neth.).
301. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
302. Conclusie A-G Aben 12 maart 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:229, § 4 (Neth.).
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III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
As the previous section’s overview has shown, law enforcement agencies use
various methods of location tracking, often on the basis of different statutory
powers or conditioned by different legal-protection regimes. In this section, we
analyze whether patterns can be discerned in the ways in which the countries we
studied deal with the privacy implications associated with these manifold tracking
methods. The analysis proceeds from two perspectives. First, we discuss the factors
that courts or lawmakers use to assess the intrusiveness of a particular tracking
method or case, which should give some insight into how privacy is protected in
this context. Second, we discuss how privacy is framed in the argumentation, which
reveals the underlying conceptualizations of privacy that seem to inform courts’ and
lawmakers’ assessment of tracking’s intrusiveness. This offers insight into the nature
of the privacy interest(s) at issue in police tracking. Together, these perspectives
provide insight into how privacy is protected in the context of police tracking and
how boundaries between lesser and more serious privacy intrusions are drawn.
A. Which Factors Influence the Seriousness of Privacy Infringements?
A useful starting point for discussing factors used in assessing how seriously
some form of location tracing interferes with privacy is the list of factors emerging
from the Dutch conceptualization of “systematicness.”303 Most of these factors also
turn up in several other jurisdictions, which also apply some additional factors.
Overall, then, we can discern eight relevant factors. As in Dutch law,304 none of
these will constitute a necessary or a sufficient condition on its own in any of our
jurisdictions: generally, a combination of factors will be decisive.
1. Use of a Technical Device
Courts and lawmakers often recognize that technological affordances matter,
especially since technology-facilitated surveillance will often have greater impact
than mere human perception-based surveillance. Nevertheless, use of a technical
device in itself is not necessarily determinative. In the German Uzun judgment, the
court observed that section 163f of the Criminal Code on “longer observation” only
contains an element of duration, and hence applies to all “longer” forms of
observation regardless of whether they are executed with a technical device.305 And
the Dutch lawmaker takes a nuanced approach:
In observation, technical devices reinforce and support human functions.
From that perspective, observation with technical devices is not a separate
category [from human observation]. (. . .) The turning point is not whether
or not a technical device is used, but the intensity of the observation.
Still, observation with a device that is a little more sophisticated than
303.
304.
305.

See supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.
Blom, supra note 102, comment 4(d)–(e).
BGH Jan. 24 2001, 3 StR 324/00 (Ger.).
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common-or-garden binoculars, will in practice soon have sufficient
intensity or frequency to be systematic.306
Thus, the main factor is not technology use as such, but whether a technical
device merely enhances or facilitates what humans can perceive anyway (or goes
beyond that). Ordinary devices that merely enhance human senses, such as
binoculars, do not in themselves, in Dutch law, lead to “systematic” observation,
but stronger forms of human-sense enhancement, such as using a telescope, may
result in it.307 The Polish District Court in Suwałki observed that a GPS tracker
facilitated a much larger and more precise insight into someone’s movements than
is possible with direct human observation,308 much like the concurring opinions of
Justices Sotomayor and Alito of the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones. However, courts
may also argue that technology-based tracking does not go significantly beyond
human perception, as had several U.S. decisions decided prior to Jones and Carpenter.
For example, in Knotts, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the use of a beeper merely
augmented the visual surveillance capabilities that police could generally use. As
such, it did not alter the Court’s conclusion that surveillance on public roads and in
“open fields” did not attract Fourth Amendment protections because the suspects
voluntarily exposed their movements in such places to third parties. And “[n]othing
in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and
technology afforded them in this case.”309 In a similar vein, the Sixth Circuit in
United States v. Forest310 observed that there was “no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the cell-site data because the DEA agents could have obtained the same
information by following Garner’s car.”311 Altogether, the assessment of location
tracking’s intrusiveness seems to require a fine-grained analysis of the particular
affordances of technical devices at issue and nuanced argumentation regarding how
it compares to human observation. Beepers give less comprehensive insight in
movement patterns than GPS trackers and, similarly, telescopes are more intrusive
than binoculars. There is, apparently, a fine line between devices that merely
strengthen but do not really alter the possibilities of human perception, and those
that augment human perception to the extent that they do make a qualitative
difference. And this fine line between mere perception-strengthening and
qualitative enhancement may also shift over time.312
Another aspect of technology that makes a qualitative difference is recording.
While Czech law does not distinguish between human and technical tracking as
306. Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, No. 3 at 70 (Neth.).
307. Blom, supra note 102, comment 4(e).
308. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
309. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
310. United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005).
311. Id. at 951.
312. Cf. Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 21 (holding that surveillance law must be
“particularly precise, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more
sophisticated”).
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such, written approval of the prosecutor is required as soon as recordings are made
of what is being observed.313 In Dutch law, any recording of the observed will make
the observation “systematic,” even during a short period, as this facilitates exact and
complete reproduction of the observed at any later moment, which is not possible
with human senses. The only exception to this general rule is taking a few
photographs, which is considered non-systematic.314 And, in Canadian law, it
appears that the long-term retention of ALPR scan data enabled by recording
capabilities crosses the relevant threshold for legality. Polish law seems to be an
outlier in this respect, as it does not consider recording to be a relevant factor as
such.315
2. Place
The place(s) where someone’s movements are tracked is a second important
factor. It often matters whether location tracking concerns movements in public
places or (also) in private places, such as homes. Tracking in public is often
considered to only constitute a minor interference with privacy as such,316 while
tracking in private places is often considered intrinsically intrusive.317 Certain other
factors can alter this assessment, such as sophisticated technology use318 and
intensity,319 but not always easily so. Duration, for example, often seems less
important than place. In Dutch law, for instance, a lengthy observation of someone
in places where his behavior could be observed by anyone will not result in the
person feeling limited in his right to undisturbed privacy,320 but a short observation
with a device in an intimate place, such as a brothel, is already considered
systematic.321 In the United States, this distinction was recognized (but not
applicable) in Knotts, and it was dispositive in United States v. Karo, where police
tracked cans of ether into the suspects’ homes using a beeper, violating the Fourth
Amendment.322 Thus, the publicness of a place is a major factor in the reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis in the United States.

313. See Trestní řád [Criminal Procedure Code], Zákon č. 141/1961 Sb. § 158d(2) (Czech).
314. Blom, supra note 102, comment 4(e); see also Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1,
16 (observing that technologically monitoring a scene in public is of a similar character as human
observation, but that privacy considerations may arise “once any systematic or permanent record comes
into existence”).
315. Art. 15(5a) Police Act (Pol.) (allowing both observation and recording).
316. See, e.g., supra notes 86–89, 106, 127–28, 210, 249, 272 and accompanying text.
317. See infra Section III.B.1.b.
318. See supra Section III.A.1.
319. See infra Section III.A.3.
320. HR 18 mei 1999, NJ 2000, 104 m.nt. TMS § 5.3 (Neth.).
321. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, No. 7 at 47 (Neth.).
322. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984).
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3. Intensity: Depth, Continuity, and Frequency
The third factor in the Dutch list is the intensity of observation, which is an
amalgam of closely related sub-factors, such as the depth, continuity, and frequency
of surveillance. The closer, deeper, more continuous, or more frequent the
observation, the higher its intensity. Continuous observation will be more intrusive
than observation with intervals.323 This factor also informed the court’s assessment
in Maynard, where the judge argued that while the GPS-tracked car may have moved
in public, its movements were not actually exposed to the public over the period of
28 days “because the likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is
effectively nil.” Additionally, the continuity of tracking over this period resulted in
an overall picture that was more intense than individual observations at discrete
points in time could reveal.324 Thus, the court found that the combination of
duration and intensity outweighed the fact that the tracking occurred in public places.
Similar arguments emphasizing the high intensity of (longer-term) GPS tracking as
compared to human tailing are advanced in Italian doctrine, although not yet in in
Italian case law itself.325 At the same time, Italian authors also point out that GPS
tracking is less intense than human tailing in some respects,326 again demonstrating
that a fine-grained analysis of how particular tracking technologies afford more or
less intrusive insight into people’s movements and behavior is required.
4. Duration
The duration of tracking is a fourth factor. Although evidently relevant—
tracking someone for a year is obviously more intrusive than doing the same for a
day—duration is a highly fluid factor, and the length of observation will usually only
matter to the degree that other factors (such as place327 and intensity328) make it
more or less intrusive. The only exception in our sample is Germany, which
considers any form of observation longer than 24 hours to be intrusive.329 In other
jurisdictions, the fluidity of duration can be seen in highly divergent assessments of
the intrusiveness of tracking over various periods of time: 28 days of (continuous)
GPS tracking of a car was considered sufficiently intrusive as to require a warrant
in Jones,330 but three months of (non-continuous) GPS-based car tracking was
considered “a relatively short period of time” in Uzun.331 Thirty days was considered

323. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, No. 7 at 49 (Neth.); cf. Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 27 (observing that the tracking occurred essentially only at weekends and when traveling
in accomplice’s car); R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 534 (Can.) (“Certainly, it could not be said that the
device was capable of tracking the location of a vehicle at all times.”).
324. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., supra notes 319–20 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., supra note 323 and accompanying text.
329. See STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] § 163f(1) (Ger.).
330. See supra notes 66–67, 151.
331. Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 27.

First to Printer_Koops (Do Not Delete)

2019]

LOCATION TRACKING BY POLICE

3/13/2019 10:14 AM

681

reasonable by the Canadian Supreme Court, especially given the “the urgent need
to protect the community” from a suspected serial killer.332 While such evaluative
differences may relate to differences in countries’ legal systems, we think they more
likely result from the influence of other factors, such as the different intensity
(continuous as opposed to interval-based tracking) in Jones and Uzun. This is
corroborated by the role duration plays within single jurisdictions: Dutch law, for
instance, treats tracking someone’s location in or near a brothel for a day or so as
systematic,333 as is (continuous) “observation lasting for nine months,”334 yet
observation over a period of 27 months in which the suspect was observed 60 times
in public spaces (mainly by humans, although also by one static camera aimed at
someone else’s dwelling) was considered non-systematic.335 Also, we encounter
different assessments of duration in relation to different tracking technologies: car
tracking for one or two days would likely not be considered particularly privacyintrusive in the United States, but some scholars consider location records, in the
context of law-enforcement access to third-party records, “highly private” if they
cover more than 24 hours.336 This suggests that the intensity of what location
tracking can reveal colors the interpretation of the tracking’s duration, rather than
the other way around. The relativity of duration as a factor is, finally, also visible in
the European Court of Human Right’s observation in Uzun that the lack of a fixed
statutory limit on the duration of monitoring was compensated by the general
requirement of proportionality.337
5. Degree of Suspicion
A minor factor in the Dutch list, not mentioned in textbooks but occasionally
applied in case law, is the degree of suspicion against someone.338 In a few cases,
Dutch courts have observed that someone engaging in criminal activity (such as
spraying graffiti) or being associated with a burglary crime-scene cannot have a
reasonable expectation to not be observed by the police.339 Similarly, a U.S. court
332. R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 538 (Can.).
333. See HR 18 mei 1999, NJ 2000, 104 m.nt. TMS § 5.3 (Neth.).
334. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 403, No. 7 at 50 (Neth.).
335. HR 18 mei 1999, NJ 2000, 104 m.nt. TMS (Neth.) (before art. 126g Dutch CPC was in
force, but the judgement is still a touchstone in the interpretation of systematic observation, according
to Blom, supra note 102, comment 4(e)).
336. See Freiwald, supra note 194, at 913 (referring to Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and
Historic Location Surveillance After United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach,
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 819 (2013) and agreeing with his conclusion that, in Freiwald’s
summary, “most location records would fall under the highly private category,” while “information for
a period of up to twenty-four hours [is] moderately private, and information for a single point in time
[is] not private.” (footnotes omitted)).
337. Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 23.
338. This is also a factor influencing the acceptability of privacy intrusions, as seen in statutory
or case law requirements for a certain level of suspicion to be met, but here we discuss it as a factor
influencing the seriousness of the privacy intrusion.
339. See supra notes 106, 301; see also HR 10 April 2001, NJ 2001, 424 m.nt. § 3.4 (Neth.)
(finding that degree of suspicion can be considered when assessing the lawfulness of observation).
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held that contraband, by its very nature as something that a suspect has no legal
right to possess in the first place, cannot attract a legitimate expectation of privacy;
thus, tracking it cannot violate a Fourth Amendment interest.340 Such
argumentation suggests that if there is a high likelihood that someone is involved in
criminal activity, they have a lower reasonable expectation not to be tracked by
police, which apparently (at least in some cases) will diminish the seriousness of the
privacy intrusion.
6. Object of Tracking
Not included in the Dutch list of intrusiveness-influencing factors as such, but
quite prominent in the Dutch statutory regulation of observation, is the object of
tracking—a factor that we also find in other jurisdictions. Generally, tracking a thing
is less intrusive than tracking a person (except, as noted, if something is tracked into
someone’s home). Placing (non-consensually) a tracking device on a person (i.e., on
the body or clothes, or on items typically carried in clothing, such as smartphones)
is prohibited in Dutch law and is regulated more strictly in Canada and the United
States.341 Similarly, in U.K. law, location tracking of goods is not considered privacyrelevant, while location tracking of people is; as a consequence, it depends whether
installing a tracking device on a car has the purpose of following the car or its
occupants342—a distinction also made in the Dutch regulation of ALPR recordings,
which only allows photographing (license-plate carrying parts of) cars but not
people.343
Prior to Carpenter, lower-court judges in the United States had similarly argued
that acquiring cell-site location information is intrusive because cell-phones are
worn on or kept close to the body, both for historical344 and for prospective345
CSLI. This holding was confirmed by the Supreme Court (at least for historical
records) in Carpenter. Because of the close association of cell-phones with persons,
Canadian scholars also have argued that IMSI catchers for location tracking require
an “Individual Tracking” warrant, not a warrant to track a thing.346
Altogether, then, it matters in several jurisdictions whether location tracking
uses a method that interferes with bodily privacy or yields location information
closely associated with a physical person, as opposed to methods that track the
location of things not usually carried on or close to the human body.

340. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1976).
341. See supra Section II.B.3.
342. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 272–73.
344. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 193.
345. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D. Md. 2011) [hereinafter Specified Wireless Tel.] (citing a
study that 65 percent of U.S. adults have slept with their phone nearby), discussed in Rothstein, supra
note 191, at 518.
346. See Israel & Parsons, supra note 163, at 57.
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7. Covertness
The Dutch list of factors does not include covertness: although it may not
usually be useful for police to track someone overtly, Dutch law considers this
equally intrusive as covert tracking if done in a systematic way (i.e., depending on
technology use, place, intensity, and duration).347 In contrast, covertness is a primary
factor in the U.K. regulation of surveillance, since visual observation is subject to
RIPA’s authorization requirements only when it is covert.348 Polish law does not
distinguish between overt and covert observation in public places,349 but the
Suwałki District Court found the covert nature of GPS tracking to be a relevant
factor for applying stricter procedural requirements.350
Somewhat remarkably, covertness works the other way around in the Italian
framework for GPS tracking, where overt tracking turns out to be considered more
intrusive than covert tracking. Since GPS tracking is not specifically regulated, it
counts as an atypical means of searching for evidence (Article 189 of the Italian
Criminal Code), implying that results can be admitted by the judge if they are
suitable for proving the facts and do not prejudice the moral liberty of the person;
the latter is only the case when persons are affected in their mental freedom to
choose. Since GPS tracking is a covert measure, unnoticed by the subject, and the
resulting data are not statements (expressions of the mind), the followed person’s
mental self-determination is not at stake. Thus, the results of GPS tracking can be
used as evidence.351 Here, we see that the intrusiveness of location tracking has
multiple dimensions and that interference with physical or behavioural privacy
may—at least in this Italian case—be considered less important than interference
with mental privacy.
Altogether then, we find that covertness is sometimes considered a factor of
importance when assessing location tracking’s privacy-intrusiveness. However, in
many cases, it does not seem to play a significant role.
8. Active Generation of Data
A final factor, absent in Dutch law but prominent particularly in the United
States, is whether police passively acquire or receive data that is generated anyway
(particularly by those under investigation) or cause data to be generated at their own
initiative. The latter is considered more intrusive, while the former is generally
347. Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 403, No. 3 at 70 (Neth.) (stating that the “description of
observation does not include that the observation is covert” and that “[s]ystematic forms of non-covert
observation are also covered by the description, although in practice these have limited meaning”).
348. As defined in Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23, § 26(9)(a) (UK),
surveillance is covert “if, and only if, it is carried out in a manner that is calculated to ensure that persons
who are subject to the surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking place.”
349. See OPALINSKI, ROGALSKI & SZUSTAKIEWICZ, supra note 57.
350. II Ka 267/13 District Court Suwałki, 19 December 2013 (Pol.).
351. ERCOLE APRILE & FILIPPO SPIEZIA, LE INTERCETTAZIONI TELEFONICHE ED
AMBIENTALI 158–59 (2004); CLAUDIO MARINELLI, INTERCETTAZIONI PROCESSUALI E NUOVI
MEZZI DI RICERCA DELLA PROVA 240–41 (2004); TABASCO, supra note 96, at 166.
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considered not or less intrusive because of the third-party doctrine, as was most
visible in the regulation of cell-site location information in the lead up to Carpenter
(although, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court held that the third-party doctrine did
not apply to the CSLI at issue in that case).352
When law enforcement itself initiates the generation of cell-phone metadata
(such as with a GPS ping or by dialing the subject’s cell-phone), the rationale behind
the third-party doctrine would not seem to apply, making the privacy intrusion
larger than when acquiring data generated by subjects themselves.353 Somewhat
more complicated is the issue of prospective CSLI, which is considered by some
U.S. courts (but not by others) to be more intrusive than historical CSLI.354 In this
line of thinking, an order for prospective data ensures that police will acquire all
location data generated in the period following the order, which otherwise might
not have been stored by the provider, thus implying a more active role of law
enforcement in the data’s existence. German law also treats prospective CSLI as
somewhat more intrusive than historical CSLI, since it applies some additional
requirements,355 but Dutch and Czech law treat both in the same way,356 suggesting
they do not consider it relevant for the privacy assessment whether law enforcement
actively ensures that future location data will be recorded. The distinction between
passive registration and active generation of data is also applied in the German
regulation of silent SMS,357 but not in the Dutch legal assessment of the same
method,358 showing consistency in how these countries use the factor of active
involvement in data generation in their assessments across different methods of
location tracking.
In the United States, this factor also plays a role in the assessment of Wi-Fi
tracking: even if police use technology not in general public use (such as
MoocherHunter software), identifying the location of someone using an open
Wi-Fi router is not considered a Fourth Amendment search because the person
voluntarily generates a signal that is broadcast into publicly accessible space outside
his home.359

352. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also Carpenter v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“We decline to extend Smith and Miller to cover these novel
circumstances. Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is
held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
353. Rothstein, supra note 193, at 510 (referring to United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951
(6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543
U.S. 1050 (2005), which determined that the third-party doctrine does not apply if police dial the
subject’s cell phone to generate CSLI).
354. See supra note 209.
355. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 196, 199 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 223.
358. See HR 1 juli 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1569 (Neth.).
359. See supra notes 292–93.
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B. How is Privacy Framed?
The previous section showed that many factors can play a role in an
assessment of the privacy intrusion of police tracking. There is considerable
variation, not only among but also within jurisdictions. Which combination of
factors is looked at, and how these are weighed, also depends considerably on the
context of the tracking method and how it is applied. Within this large variation,
however, it is possible to discern some patterns by looking at the underlying privacy
interests at issue. Courts and lawmakers evaluate police tracking’s intrusiveness
from certain normative perspectives, associated with the privacy concern(s) that
they perceive to be at stake. These perspectives function as “frames,” that is,
windows on the world through which a problem is looked at. Framing plays an
important role in defining problems in social policy, and the way a problem is
defined—the window through which it is observed—influences the way it is or can
be solved: frames have considerable impact on the solution space of a problem.360
Looking at the frames applied by lawmakers and courts to regulate police tracking
gives us insight into how existing conceptualizations of privacy, including classic
privacy frames and informational self-determination, are applied in the context of
new criminal investigation methods. And interestingly, we see that new privacy
frames are being proposed and developed to regulate police tracking, which is
indicative of regulators’ increasing discomfort with solutions that result from
assessments relying on traditional privacy frames.
1. Classic Privacy Frames
Police tracking in its classic form—human tailing and observation—is usually
restricted to publicly accessible places and, as it requires considerable time and
effort, faces practical obstacles that commonly prevent it from being used very
widely or intrusively. As a result, classic police tracking does not interfere with those
aspects of the private sphere that are traditionally protected most strongly.
However, with increasing technological capabilities allowing more intense forms of
following people, police tracking may intrude more deeply into the private sphere.
Indeed, we see that courts and lawmakers are particularly concerned with forms of
police tracking that interfere with privacy types that are traditionally strongly
protected, particularly by constitutional rights. In those cases, the following four
classic privacy frames tend to be applied.
a. Secrecy of Communications
Since an important part of tracking people consists of tracking the movements
of their cell-phones, the frame of communicational privacy is easily triggered.
However, this frame is largely used by lawmakers and courts to argue why location

360. Donald A. Schön, Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy, in
METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 137 (Andrew Ortony ed., 1993).
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tracking is not particularly intrusive, since it only collects metadata, not the content
of communications.361 While this argumentation is criticized in literature because it
does not do justice to the intrusiveness of collecting locational metadata,362
the emphasis on protecting communications content within the frame of
communicational privacy still seems prevalent in most jurisdictions, which seems to
foreclose arguments for strong privacy protection on the basis of cell-phones being
tracked. We also see similar arguments with other forms of location tracking, such
as GPS surveillance of cars, where the privacy-intrusiveness is argued to be lower
than that of communications interception.363 Overall, then, the frame of
communicational privacy tends to be applied to argue against the need for particular
safeguards against location tracking, suggesting a general prioritization of
communicational privacy over the behavioral privacy that is associated with people’s
movements.
b. Home
As we observed, place is an important factor in normative assessments of
location tracking364 because the frame of spatial privacy features one of the
traditionally strongest forms of privacy protection, the home. As Freiwald observed
in the U.S. context, the “only affirmative constitutional analysis the appellate courts
have ratified for determining reasonable expectations of privacy in location data,
then, is based on the doctrine that the Fourth Amendment protects our privacy
interests in the home and surrounding areas.”365
Most jurisdictions put considerably stronger safeguards in place when
surveillance consists of, or has a likelihood of, tracking someone or something
inside the home. For instance, Poland and Czechia apply stricter conditions when
people are observed or followed in non-public places, as does the U.K. for
residential premises and Germany for (also very short) observations in the home.366
Dutch law even prohibits visual observation inside the home altogether;367 however,
this prohibition is limited to making visual recordings inside the home, so that location
tracking inside the home seems simply allowed.
With technological forms of location tracking at a distance, it is not always
clear whether or when this will involve following someone into private spaces.
Courts in several jurisdictions argue that (ex post) an operation involved in-home
tracking or (ex ante) an operation has considerable likelihood (particularly given a
certain duration of tracking) of involving in-home tracking. This argument is

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 184–85.
See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.A.2.
Freiwald, supra note 194, at 907.
See supra notes 29, 81–82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 99.
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particularly used in relation to cell-phone tracking,368 but we also encounter it in
GPS tracking cases.369
Where the law does not impose specific safeguards on location tracking, it is
frequently criticized in literature from the perspective of home protection. Italian
authors argue that acquiring cell-phone location data interferes with the inviolability
of the home370 and that GPS tracking of cars is insufficiently regulated, because cars
can be parked in an area belonging to protected space (as part of curtilage or private
yards).371
c. Body
In some countries, tracking items worn on or close to the body is considered
more privacy-intrusive than tracking other items; the Netherlands considers it so
privacy-intrusive as to prohibit it altogether.372 The frame of bodily integrity will be
triggered more easily in jurisdictions that have specific constitutional protection
for privacy of the body, as is the case in the Netherlands.373 However, other
jurisdictions we studied have constitutional protection of (the body of) the person
in some form,374 and one may wonder why, for instance, Germany does not apply
stricter safeguards for tracking body-worn devices, given its constitutional right to
physical integrity.375 Possibly, this is because observation for longer than twentyfour hours is already strictly regulated in Germany,376 and the effort and risk of

368. See, e.g., supra notes 212–13, 255 and accompanying text; see also Rothstein, supra note 193,
at 528–29 (observing that the “home is sacrosanct in Fourth Amendment law: all details of the home
are intimate details. . . . Precise cell phone tracking, like a beeper, reveals critical facts about the home’s
interior.” (references omitted)).
369. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment violation occurred at the moment agents tracked a beeper-equipped can after it entered a
private residence, as this allowed the Government “to surreptitiously [employ] an electronic device to
obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the
house”).
370. Dinacci, supra note 185, at 371 (arguing that “it appears indisputable that the possibility to
‘trace’ the presence of persons in the home of a subject through acquiring traffic data is equivalent to
rendering ‘visible’ that which the rights-holder intended to remain confidential”); id. at 392 (finding
that acquiring location data through a cell phone traffic data production order infringes the inviolability
of the home, and that the current regulation is not in line with the constitutional requirements).
371. Bene, supra note 42, at 361 (arguing that in GPS tracking “for longer periods . . . the risk is
more concrete that the subject will park also in places of private abode”); see also MARINELLI, supra note
94, at 256–57.
372. See supra Section II.B.3.
373. GW. [Constitution] art. 11 (Neth.).
374. See Koops et al., supra note 17, at 529–31 (surveying constitutional protections of the (body
of the) person).
375. GRUNDGESETZ [G] [BASIC LAW] , art. 2(2) (Ger.) (translation at Basic Law for the Federal
Republic of Germany, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ,
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/7UDD-5HCP] ( last
visited Feb. 3, 2019)).
376. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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detection inherent in planting a tracker on body-worn devices will be too high for
only short periods of tracking.
d. Property
While bodily integrity is a key privacy frame in the Dutch context, the
protection of property and proprietary privacy form an important frame in the
common-law context,377 most visibly in the United States. Significantly, the majority
opinion in Jones resolved the privacy issues raised by GPS tracking by resorting to
the frame of property rather than the reasonable expectation of privacy test;378
a similar property interest emerges in the U.K.’s regulation of GPS tracking.379 This
focus on property interests, rather than reasonable expectations of privacy, was
subjected to criticism by the concurring justices, and has also been characterized as
ill-suited for non-trespassory forms of location tracking that are now (increasingly)
prevalent in modern society.380 Occasionally, the property frame may also be useful
in civil-law systems to discuss the privacy interests raised by breaking into a car in
order to place a tracking device.381
2. The Informational Privacy Frame
Informational privacy is, fifty years after Westin and the landmark German
decision on informational self-determination,382 also a classic privacy frame, but we
discuss it separately from the previous ones since it is a transversal frame, cutting
across all primary types of privacy.383 While location tracking is frequently discussed
within the frame of the privacy of communications, home, or body, we also
encounter arguments that connect these, and other aspects of private life, into a
narrative that emphasizes the information that can be derived from tracking
someone’s movements. This informational frame is applied more by doctrinal
scholars than by courts or lawmakers.

377. See Koops et al., supra note 17 at 516–18 (surveying constitutional protections of property).
378. See supra note 66.
379. See supra note 125.
380. See, e.g., Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones: Commercial
Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 332–
33 (2012) (“[T]he Court’s most recent opinion in United States v. Jones, where the Court expanded its
definition of a search, fails to keep current with technology.”); David Gray, A Collective Right to Be
Secure from Unreasonable Tracking, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 189, 195 (2015) (“[A]s Justice Sotomayor
points out in Jones, we do not yet have constitutional principles capable of addressing, much less limiting,
[many forms of contemporary] surveillance . . . .”).
381. See supra text accompanying notes 297–301 (the Dutch discussion on the flock fiber
method); cf. supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text (the Italian discussion whether a car’s inside is
a protected space), but that discussion fits more in a home frame than a property frame.
382. BVerfGE, 1 BvR 280/66, Oct. 13, 1971 (Ger.) (identifying a right to informational selfdetermination); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining privacy as the claim to
determine when, how, and to what extent information about people is communicated to others).
383. Koops et al., supra note 17 at 568–69.
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For instance, Wagnerová et al. argue that the Czech constitutional protection
of private life (Article 10 Charter), and its element of informational selfdetermination, includes the right to protection from surveillance (being watched or
followed in public spaces), especially by public authorities; nevertheless, such
powers of the state are not altogether excluded.384 In Italy, authors criticize the
Supreme Court’s limiting of its evaluation of GPS tracking to the inviolability of the
home, arguing that other fundamental rights are also at stake. Moreover, since the
production order for traffic data (which includes location data) has safeguards to
protect personal data, similar safeguards should apply to GPS tracking; in particular,
a motivated order by the public prosecutor.385 Rothstein argues that “precise
persistent cell phone tracking reveals private facts” and points out that the “private
facts” model is often used to evaluate new forms of electronic surveillance,386 thus
emphasizing the usefulness of informational privacy as a frame for assessing
location tracking. Similarly, Buruma argues that when the Dutch list of factors
relevant for judging the “systematicness” of tracking does not point to a clear
outcome, the courts could particularly look at “whether data are collected on ‘certain
privileged domains of life.’”387
While informational privacy is thus frequently used in literature to argue that
location tracking is, or can be, considerably intrusive, courts, in contrast, tend to use
the frame to argue that certain instances of location tracking are not particularly
intrusive. The European Court of Human Rights in Uzun, for instance, observed
that “GPS surveillance is by its very nature to be distinguished from other methods
of visual or acoustical surveillance which . . . as a rule . . . disclose more information
on a person’s conduct, opinions or feelings.”388 The Canadian Supreme Court in
Wise, like the U.S. Supreme Court in Knotts, found that the information obtained
through using a tracking beeper “merely assisted the police to gather evidence
which, to a great extent, they had [or could have] obtained by visually observing the
vehicle.”389 Similarly, the Dutch Supreme Court allowed location tracking with an
IMSI catcher on the basis of Article 3 of the Police Act of 2012, partly because of
the fact that it only reveals the phone’s (or user’s) location but not what the user
does or says.390
While the latter argument may be correct in and of itself—knowing where
someone is does not imply that you know what they are doing there—there are, of
course, certain correlations between places and behavior. In a few cases, we see
courts recognizing that inferences about private life can be drawn from location
384. E. WAGNEROVÁ, I. POSPÍŠIL, T. LANGÁŠEK & V. ŠIMÍČEK, LISTINA ZÁKLADNÍCH PRÁV
A SVOBOD, KOMENTÁŘ 285 (2012).
385. GIUSEPPE TABASCO, PROVE NON DISCIPLINATE DALLA LEGGE NEL PROCESSO PENALE
166–67 (2011); see also Bene, supra note 42, at 366–67; Marinelli, supra note 94, at 257.
386. Rothstein, supra note 191, at 528.
387. Buruma, supra note 48, at 658.
388. Uzun v. Germany, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 18.
389. R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 543 (Can.).
390. See HR 1 juli 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1562 (Neth.).
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data and that these inferences may even reveal insight into intimate parts of life.
When assessing the gravity of the encroachment connected with an investigation
measure, the German Constitutional Court considers
the processed data’s relevance to personality [to be] of special significance.
A measure is considered highly invasive in particular when the relevant
data allow conclusions about the nature and intensity of interpersonal
relationships, personal interests, habits and tendencies, or the content of
communication.391
Now, because of the increasing digitization of telecommunication, traffic data
reveal an ever-clearer picture of communication partners, which implies that
increasingly, “communication data allow conclusions to be drawn about their
personality, and even the generation of a personality profile becomes a real
possibility.”392 The intimate nature of inferences possibly drawn from location data
has been most forcefully expounded by the Maynard court: location data may reveal
whether someone “is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym,
an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of
particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact about a person,
but all such facts.”393
Such framing of location tracking is, however, as yet relatively rare among
courts in the jurisdictions we studied. We are not aware, for instance, of Canadian
courts having used similar arguments related to informational privacy in locationtracking cases (except insofar as Justice La Forest recognized the future potential of
pervasive tracking in his dissent in Wise), even though Canadian law strongly
protects “a biographical core of personal information [including] information which
tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the
individual.”394 Apparently, courts in Canada, and jurisdictions other than Germany
and the United States, have not yet felt the need to draw on the insight that location
data collected over a period of time can precisely reveal such intimate details of
lifestyle and personal choices that informed the Maynard court’s decision.

391. Vogel et al., supra note 169, at 515 (referring to BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 10, 2007, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2464
(2470), 2007 (Ger.) and BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
2006, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 976 (980), 2006 (Ger.)).
392. Id. at 515–16 (referring to BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] 2006, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 976 (980), 2006 (Ger.)).
393. See supra note 150 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 194, 214 and accompanying
text for similar arguments by the New Jersey Supreme Court under state law and by a district judge who
observed that continued tracking can reveal intimate details of a person’s life that entering someone’s
home need not reveal.
394. R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, 293 (Can.).
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3. New Privacy Frames
a. Freedom of Movement, Anonymity, and a Right Not to Be Localized
While informational privacy provides a useful frame for assessing the
intrusiveness of location tracking, as it enables looking at the information about
persons that can be derived from their movements, it may not be the only relevant
frame to do so. In our research, we encountered another novel frame that connects
informational privacy with what might be considered the main underlying privacy
interest in location tracking, the behavioral privacy that is connected to the freedom
of movement. This frame has been adopted by Italian authors, who argue that
location tracking affects the liberty of movement, which is safeguarded by Italy’s
Constitution.395 Tabasco observes that “if the liberty to circulate be understood as
liberty to move freely without being spied on by mechanical instruments that do
not allow the person to be aware of being ‘followed,’ it is evident that the activity
of GPS tracking, inherent to the localization of an individual, infringes such an
inviolable right.”396 Therefore, a “right not to be localized” should exist as a new
component of the liberty of movement.397
Such a right can be connected to the right to anonymity, which is relevant in
public space. Commenting on a 2010 GPS tracking judgment, Gentile observes that
in today’s society, people expose considerable parts of their life in social interactions
outside of the home:
This undeniable observation can, however, not legitimate any form of
intrusion into the private sphere that could engender in the individuals the
sensation of being continuously the object of control, generating doubtless
prejudicial effects that evoke the so-called panopticon effect, inhibiting the
human mind at the moment where it develops the obsession of constantly
being under control.398
In this context, the right to anonymity (diritto all’anonimato) has emerged in
Italy. This right protects people from undue and prolonged intrusions into the
private individual sphere and also when they voluntarily act in public places.399 The
right to anonymity is recognized in Italy as part of the inviolable rights of the person,
protected by Article 2 of the Constitution, and protects “situations and personal

395. Art. 16 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“Every citizen can circulate and stay freely in any part of
the national territory, subject to limitations established by law in general for reasons of health or security.
No restriction can be determined by political reasons.”).
396. Tabasco, supra note 96, at 166.
397. Id. (referring to A. Camon, L’acquisizione dei dati sul traffico delle comunicazioni, 47 RIVISTA
ITALIANA DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA PENALE 594, 633 (2005)); see also Bene, supra note 124, at 348
(asking whether GPS tracking infringes article 16 Constitution, understood also as a “right not to be
localized”).
398. Gentile, supra note 144, at 1472.
399. Id. at 1473.
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and family events from public curiosity and knowledge.”400 It is part of the “doctrine
of privacy, understood in a new and more advanced form,” which helps to safeguard
other fundamental liberties (and ultimately individual self-determination). This,
Gentile concludes, can point the way to a legislative intervention with detailed
norms for GPS tracking.401
The frame of free movement, anonymity, and a right not to be localized is, so
far, not widely applied outside of Italian scholarship. However, it sometimes pops
up in other jurisdictions too, for instance in the U.S. context, where William Herbert
has—somewhat provocatively—argued that location monitoring and control
“constitutes a vestige and incident of slavery,” implying that the Thirteenth
Amendment might apply to location tracking.402 This amendment grants Congress
“the power to enact legislation targeted at eliminating those badges and incidents of
slavery including the ‘privilege to go and come’ as one pleases.”403 Therefore, a law
could be enacted “to ban the use of tracking devices to dominate and control the
location of others.”404
Another example is a report by the Dutch Rathenau Instituut, which advises
Parliament on technology matters. In a report for the Council of Europe on
robotics, artificial intelligence, and augmented reality, it observes that pervasive
tracking and tracing has the accumulative effect of a “gradual but steady dissolving
of privacy and anonymity for the individual.”405 However, people cannot be
supposed to simply turn off their mobile devices if they do not want to be tracked
or traced. Rather, lawmakers should recognize that in this context, the right to
remain anonymous and/or the right to be let alone are at stake, “which in the robot
age could be phrased as the right to not be electronically measured, analysed or
coached.”406 Therefore, the Rathenau Instituut recommends that the Council of
Europe “clarify to what extent in the context of the robot age the right to respect
for privacy implies the right to not be measured, analysed or coached.”407 The
argument that people should not be forced to turn off their mobile devices if they
do not want to be tracked or traced is echoed in the Carpenter judgment, where the
court argued that “[w]hoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been
tailed every moment of every day for five years. . . . Only the few without cell

400. Racc. uff. corte cost., 12 aprile 1973, n. 38, (It.) (quoted in Bene supra note 124, at 362).
Both Gentile and Bene refer to Gabriella Di Paolo, Acquisizione dinamica dei dati relativi all’ubicazione
del cellulare ed altre forme di localizzazione tecnologicamente assistita. riflessioni a margine dell’esperienza
statunitense, CASSAZIONE PENALE 1219 (2008), who suggested applying the right to anonymity to
develop regulation of location tracking.
401. Gentile, supra note 144, at 1473.
402. Herbert, supra note 11, at 429.
403. Id. at 428 (referring to Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 U.S. 409, 430 (1968)).
404. Id. at 429.
405. RATHENAU INSTITUUT, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ROBOT AGE 43 (2017),
https://www.rathenau.nl/en/digitale-samenleving/human-rights-robot-age.
406. Id. at 44.
407. Id.

First to Printer_Koops (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/13/2019 10:14 AM

LOCATION TRACKING BY POLICE

693

phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.”408 From that
perspective, these limitations on law enforcement agencies’ ability to access
historical CSLI might be interpreted (although not phrased as such in the judgment)
as expressing the idea that people ought to have a reasonable claim or ability to not
be localized.
Thus, while the privacy interest in anonymity and freedom of movement is
not yet widely recognized as relevant for assessing location tracking, we think it may
become a more prevalent and productive frame in the future, as pervasive location
tracking (not only by police, but also by other public and private actors) may be
increasingly felt to stifle people’s sense that they can freely move around in public
space without an inhibitory or panoptic effect of feeling followed.
b. Mosaic Theory
A more broadly applied new frame is that of the privacy interest consisting in
the cumulative picture, or mosaic, of disparate pieces of information. Single stones
say very little, but put together, a mosaic of many small stones can be quite revealing
of someone’s private life. As the Maynard court expressed, “the whole of one’s
movements . . . reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than does the sum of
its parts.”409 Here, the judge borrowed from case law related to exemptions to
disclosure under the Federal Freedom of Information Act for national security
purposes: “What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment
to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of
information in its proper context.”410
This reasoning, which is generally referred to as the mosaic theory (endorsed
by both concurring opinions in Jones411 and built upon in Carpenter),412 has yet to
gain a firm foothold in U.S. case law. Although it is welcomed by several scholars

408. See supra note 190.
409. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
410. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (as quoted in id. at 562 (internal citations omitted)).
The mosaic theory resembles some principles from moral philosophy. Parfit points out five mistakes
in moral mathematics, which include ignoring the effects of sets of acts and ignoring small or
imperceptible effects. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 70–78 (1984). He claims that
“[e]ven if an act harms no one, this act may be wrong because it is one of a set of acts that together harm
other people.” Id. at 70 (italics in original).
411. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at
428–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
412. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (referring to information that
was “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” (emphasis added)); id. at 2217 (referring to “an
all-encompassing record” (emphasis added)) (discussing where the metaphors of encyclopedias and allencompassing records echo the mosaic theory’s metaphor of a comprehensive image made up of small
items); see also supra notes 179, 187 and accompanying text.

First to Printer_Koops (Do Not Delete)

694

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

3/13/2019 10:14 AM

[ Vol. 9:635

as an important new perspective on privacy protection in the context of law
enforcement,413 it is also criticized for vagueness and lack of normative guidance.414
Still, it seems significant that similar reasoning is applied in several of our
jurisdictions. Although not labeled in terms of the mosaic theory, and phrased in
less vivid terms than in Maynard, the argumentation in various location-tracking
cases demonstrates mosaic argumentation. For instance, the German
Bundesgerichtshof highlighted that GPS tracking technology should be considered
together with other measures: “If the application of ‘GPS’ goes along with other
interventions, each being in itself permissible, and if this leads to a comprehensive
surveillance of the person, then this can violate the proportionality principle.”415 In
effect, Germany prohibits “total surveillance” (Totalüberwachung) or “all around
surveillance” (Rundumüberwachung) that would lead to a comprehensive personality
profile of someone. This is ensured, according to the Constitutional Court, by the
general procedural guarantees of subsidiarity and proportionality, which imply that
the cumulative effect of different investigation activities needs to be taken into
account.416 The “personality profile” can be seen as a mosaic picture that reveals
the core of someone’s private life.417 The German safeguards against “total
surveillance” resonate in the U.S. Supreme Court’s warrant requirement for the
collection of historical CSLI in view of its character as “tireless and absolute
surveillance.”418

413. See, e.g., Lance H. Selva, William L. Shulman & Robert B. Rumsey, Rise of the Mosaic Theory:
Implications for Cell Site Location Tracking by Law Enforcement, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. &
PRIVACY L. 235 (2016) (“[T]he mosaic theory provides the most compelling approach to addressing
the challenge . . . to interpret and apply Fourth Amendment principles as originally conceived by the
Framers to ever-evolving technologies of surveillance.”); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of
United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12–13 (2012); see also Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic
Location Surveillance After United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach,
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2013) (outlining “an administrable” approach, informed in part
by the mosaic theory); Rothstein, supra note 193 at 527 (defending the mosaic theory against Orin Kerr’s
criticism).
414. See, e.g., Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth
Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 209–10 (2015) (finding that survey
respondents, as proxies for the subjective expectations of privacy element of the Katz test, do not
coincide with Justice Alito’s arguments in favor of the mosaic theory—particularly the claim that
duration of tracking impacts perceived intrusiveness); David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered
Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 402–11 (2013) (raising a number of criticisms of the impact of the mosaic
theory on Fourth Amendment law); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 315 (2012) (“[A]s a normative matter, courts should reject the mosaic theory.”).
415. BGH Jan. 24, 2001, 3 StR 324/00, 27 (OLG Düsseldorf) (Ger.).
416. BVerfG, Az. 2 BvR 581/01, Apr. 12, 2005 (Ger.).
417. Cf. Vogel et al., supra note 169, at 515–16 (“The quantity and the substance of
accruing traffic data serve to paint an ever clearer picture of communication participants. Increasingly,
communication data allow conclusions to be drawn about their personality, and even the generation of
a personality profile becomes a real possibility.” (italics added)).
418. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
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The mosaic metaphor is also visible in the main Dutch frame used to assess
the intrusiveness of location tracking: an investigation operation is considered
“systematic” if it results in “a more or less complete image being obtained of certain
aspects of someone’s [private] life.”419 The Polish District Court in Suwałki also
applied mosaic argumentation, where it reasoned that collecting individual bits of
information that reveal no significant conclusions about someone is to be
distinguished from the systematic collection of location data for a longer time,
which reveals far more about the person.420
Thus, in GPS-tracking cases, U.S. courts—as well as courts in Germany,
the Netherlands, and Poland—have applied the main principle of the mosaic theory,
namely that the intrusiveness of a measure should not be judged (only) on the basis
of the collection of discrete pieces of information, each of which may reveal little,
but (also) on the basis of the cumulative picture emerging from the combination of
all these pieces. This is a telltale sign that the traditional privacy frames through
which location tracking would normally be assessed, fall short when it comes to
tracking persons in public space: apparently, the frame of the home—with its
implication that acts in public can be freely observed—does not offer satisfactory
solutions, and courts therefore reframe the problem in different terms.
It remains to be seen to what extent the mosaic theory offers concrete
guidance to assess the intrusiveness of different forms of location tracking. Yet even
if the mosaic theory, in its current embryonic stage of development, lacks a concrete
yardstick to judge when the combination of stones is revealing enough to constitute
a mosaic, it has added value. This is because in framing the problem of location
tracking in terms of accumulated data, it invites looking for solutions that are better
suited to contemporary society than the answers offered by the old frame of the
public space/private space distinction. In other words, even if the mosaic theory
does not provide ready answers, by asking how much information police may gather
about someone’s private life by tracking their movements, it at least asks a more
pertinent question than the old question of whether someone has willingly exposed
themselves to being visible in public.
CONCLUSION
The answer to the question “Where have you been?” can be very telling, not
only revealing factual information about your exact whereabouts at certain points
in time, but also suggestive of your habits and preferences, and ultimately, if
sufficient location information is available, of most of your private life. Location
tracking may be age-old, but never has technology afforded so much insight into
people’s personal life as contemporary tracking technologies do. The privacy
interest in location information is therefore profound. Is this profound interest
recognized in current legal assessment on the intrusiveness of location tracking?
419.
420.

See supra note 102 (emphasis added).
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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As this Article shows, there is great variety in technologies and forms of
location tracking, and the intrusiveness of location tracking varies accordingly to a
substantial extent. Not only does the intrusiveness differ depending on the method
and technology, it also depends considerably on the way in which the technology is
applied in concrete cases. This implies that, although some general assessment of a
tracking method’s intrusiveness is possible (ALPR monitoring of cars is generally
less intrusive than GPS tracking of body-worn devices), a fine-grained analysis of
how particular tracking technologies afford more or less intrusive insight into
people’s movements and behavior, depending on how they are used, is required.
Altogether, this requires a highly context-dependent, and thus case-specific,
assessment, in which a number of factors (such as use of particular technical devices;
covertness; place, intensity, duration, and object of monitoring; and whether police
actively generate or passively receive location data) must be taken into account, none
of which is necessary or sufficient in itself.
At a deeper level of analysis, it turns out that it is not only the case that various
factors play a role in intrusiveness assessments; the way in which the privacy interest
in location tracking is framed is also relevant. When confronted with new forms of
location tracking, lawmakers and courts—understandably—initially resort to
existing privacy frames, that is, the well-established types of privacy that have been
firmly established as protection-worthy in legal systems: communications privacy,
the spatial privacy of the home, and bodily privacy, as well as informational privacy.
Viewed through these frames, location tracking usually does not appear particularly
intrusive. Framing the question as “To what extent does location tracking infringe
the privacy of communications, home, or body?” invites a prima facie answer, “not
very much.” The classic frames of communicational privacy and spatial privacy tend
to be applied to argue against the need for particular safeguards against location
tracking, suggesting a general prioritization of communicational and spatial privacy
over the behavioral privacy that is associated with people’s movements. Similarly,
from an informational privacy perspective, location tracking need not at first sight
be very privacy-sensitive since location coordinates reveal where you have been, but
not what you have done or said there. This implies that if the question of location
tracking’s intrusiveness is formulated on the basis of traditional privacy frames, the
answer tends to be biased towards downplaying the privacy infringement of location
tracking.
As our analysis shows, there is increasing discomfort with the answers thus
yielded by the traditional privacy frames. While lawmakers and courts still do resort
to these frames, arguing, for example, that GPS tracking is not very intrusive
because it is largely limited to public space and that cell-phone tracking does not
reveal communications content, scholars (and to some extent, lawmakers and
courts) have started to resort to other frames. This shift reflects an increasing
recognition that people’s locations are strongly correlated to their habits and
preferences, and that what people do can reveal as much about their inner life as
what they say. But this is, of course, not always the case: it is hard to find objective,
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a priori criteria for when behavior can be as revealing as someone’s utterances or
the details of their domestic life. This perhaps explains the intuitive appeal of the
mosaic theory, which is the main novel-privacy frame to emerge from contemporary
location-tracking cases. The mosaic theory functions as an important normative
addition to the frame of informational privacy by focusing attention on the
accumulation of information: the picture emerging from putting together discrete
pieces of information is more revealing than the sum of its parts. The combination
of the informational-privacy frame and the mosaic theory seems well-suited
to assess the intrusiveness of location tracking, since it eminently enables a
context- and case-specific assessment. Its strength may also be its weakness, since
its broad applicability in all cases does not provide a concrete yardstick to measure
when a collection of stones, put together, constitutes a mosaic. Yet we think that it
has added value over traditional privacy frames since, even if it does not give ready
answers, it asks a more pertinent question than those raised within traditional frames
of communicational, spatial, and bodily privacy.
The mosaic theory, which is as yet in a rather embryonic stage of
conceptualization, should be further developed, as it may assist in regulating twentyfirst-century criminal investigation methods that challenge privacy in ways that are
hard to address with twentieth-century legal frameworks. Its potential obviously
stretches beyond location tracking, since its abstract character may well be applied
to all forms of criminal investigation (and, indeed, to the combination of different
methods). However, because of its abstractness, the mosaic theory may also turn
out to lack normative thrust, at least when it comes to guiding the regulation of
specific forms of location tracking. There may be merit, therefore, in also
considering the other novel frame emerging from our analysis: the freedom of
movement, or the interest in moving around in publicly accessible places in relative
anonymity, without (the feeling of) being continuously monitored. This frame is
specifically suited to assess the intrusiveness of location tracking, as it connects the
informational content of location data to the underlying privacy interest, namely the
behavioral privacy of moving around in public space without the inhibitory or
panoptic effect of feeling followed. Since quite a few relatively new methods of
location tracking, such as real-time cell-phone location tracking, stealth SMS, and
IMSI catchers, are now being introduced (or are starting to be applied more broadly)
by police in many countries, there is a window of opportunity for lawmakers and
courts to consider adopting the frame of anonymity and freedom of movement to
assess the intrusiveness of location tracking.
Overall, we conclude that the analysis in this Article demonstrates that legal
privacy frameworks developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are not
well-suited for assessing the privacy-intrusiveness of contemporary locationtracking investigation methods, particularly since location tracking can have
characteristics of “tireless and absolute surveillance.” The emergence of novel
frameworks for understanding and protecting privacy opens up new pathways for
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lawmakers and courts to address the challenge of preserving privacy in the twentyfirst century.

